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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN LEGAL
ACADEMIA
DUNCAN  KENNEDY*
This Article is about affirmative  action in legal academia.  It argues
for a large expansion of our current commitment to cultural diversity on
the ground that law schools  are political institutions.  For that reason,
they should abide by the general democratic principle that people should
be represented  in institutions that have power over their  lives.  Further,
large scale affirmative action would improve the quality and increase the
value  of legal scholarship.
My  goal is to develop in the specific  context of law school  affirma-
tive action the conception  of "race  consciousness"  that Gary Peller de-
scribes and advocates in his essay in this issue of the Duke Law Journal.  I
We need to be able to talk about the political and cultural relations of the
various  groups that compose our society  without falling into racialism,
essentialism, or a concept of the "nation"  tied to the idea of sovereignty.
We need to conceptualize groups in  a "post-modem"  way,2 recognizing
their reality in our lives without losing sight of the partial, unstable, con-
tradictory character  of group existence.
I present my argument  in the form of a dialogue with our society's
dominant way of understanding race and merit in academia, which I call
"colorblind meritocratic fundamentalism."  I use Randall Kennedy's  ar-
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1.  Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DuKE  L.J.  758.  Two other articles  that strongly influ-
enced this one are Freeman, Legitimizing Racial  Discrimination  Through Anti-Discrimination Law,
62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978)  [hereinafter Freeman, Legitimizing Racial  Discrimination],  and Free-
man, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: a Critical  Legal Essay, 23  HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV.  295  (1988)  [hereinafter  Freeman, Racism].
2.  See  (very)  generally J.-F.  LYOTARD,  THE  POSTMODERN  CONDITION:  A  REPORT  ON
KNOWLEDGE  (G.  Bennington & B. Massumi trans.  1984);  J. GALLOP,  THINKING  THROUGH  THE
BODY  (1988).  The writer who  has most influenced my thinking about race is Harold Cruse. See H.
CRUSE,  THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO  INTELLECTUAL  (1967);  H. CRUSE,  REBELLION  OR REVOLU-
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ticle, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia  3 as principal  representative of
this point of view.  Throughout, I will be responding to Kennedy's  gen-
eral understanding  of how we  should  organize  legal academic  life in  a
situation of racial and cultural division, rather than to his specific attacks
on works of race-conscious  scholarship.
I think the articles Kennedy discusses4 and the others in the genre of
Critical Race Theory,5 represent the most exciting recent development in
American  legal  scholarship.  On  some  issues,  I agree  with  Kennedy's
criticisms.6  But overall I see the articles  as developing  positions  that I
share, and I don't find his article  convincing as a refutation of them.7  I
3.  R. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia,  102 HARv.  L.  REV.  1745  (1989).  For
other responses to Randall Kennedy's  article, see Colloquy:  Responses to Randall  Kennedy's Racial
Critiques of Legal Academia,  103 HARv.  L. REV.  1844 (1990)  (responses  by Brewer, Ball, Barnes,
Delgado, and Espinoza);  Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA.
L. REv. 95  (1990).
4.  Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67  CALIF. L.
REV. 1 (1979)  [hereinafter Bell, Minority Admissions]; D. BELL,  The Unspoken Limit of  Affirmative
Action:  The Chronicle of  the DeVine  Gift,  in AND WE  ARE  NOT SAVED:  THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE 140 (1987)  [hereinafter D. DELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED];  Delgado, The Impe-
rial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132  U. PA.  L. REV.  561  (1984)
Matsuda, Affirmative Action and  Legal Knowledge.: Planting  Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11  HARV.
WomEN's  L.J.  1 (1988)  [hereinafter Matsuda, Affirmative Action]; Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:
Critical  Legal Studies and Reparations. 22 HARV.  C.R.-C.L.  L. REV.  323  (1987)  [hereinafter  Mat-
suda, Looking to the Bottom].
5.  Critical Race Theory is an "emergent"  phenomenon, and it may turn out that these articles
do not have as much in common as they appear to me to do.  This list is illustrative only.  I am not
familiar with the entire literature.  This list is not an attempt to establish a canon.  Austin, Sapphire
Boundl, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 539; Calmore, Exploring the Significance ofRace and Class  in Represent-
ing the Black Poor, 61  OR. L. REV.  201  (1982);  Cook, Beyond Critical  Legal Studies:  The Recon-
structive  Theology of  Dr.  Martin Luther  King, Jr., 103 HARv.  L. REV. 985 (1990);  Crenshaw, Race,
Reform  and Retrenchment" Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law,  101
HARV.  L.  REV.  1331  (1988);  Kenyatta,  Critical Footnotes to Parker's "Constitutional Theory,"
HARv.  BLACKLETSER  J.,  Spring  1985, at 49;  Lim,  The Kuleana Act Revisited:  The Survival of
Traditional  Hawaiian  Commoner  Rights in Land, 64 WASH. L. REV. 233  (1989);  Lawrence, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with  Unconscious  Racism, 39  STAN.  L. REV.  317,  324
(1987);  Lopez, Training Future Lawyers to  Work with  the Politically and Socially Subordinated:
Anti-Generic  Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV.  305 (1989); McDougall,  The New Property  vs.  the
New  Community, 24  U.S.F.  L.  REV.  399  (1990);  Torres,  Local Knowledge, Local Color: Critical
Legal Studies and the Law of Race Relations  25  SAN  DIEGO  L. REV.  1043  (1988);  Williams, Al-
chemical Notes" Reconstructing  Ideals  from Deconstructed  Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401
(1987).  See generally Ansley, Stirring  the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil  Rights Scholar-
ship, 74 CORNELL L. REV.  993 (1989).
6.  Like Randall Kennedy, I see it as a weakness  of current attempts at radical  politics in the
United  States that we  tend  to sentimentalize  all "victims  of oppression."  Another weakness  is  a
tendency to exaggerate  the relative  importance of current  racism in explaining racially unjust out-
comes, and, by contrast, to underestimate the relative importance of past racism,  and non-race eco-
nomic and institutional factors.
7.  With Derrick Bell, I regard race, a proxy for connection to a subordinated cultural commu-
nity,  as an intellectual  credential in hiring and promotion decisions.  See infra Part II. A.  I agree
with Man Matsuda, as paraphrased by Kennedy, that "by the exclusions  imposed by existing prac-CULTUR,4L  PLURALISM
think it's best to leave it to the authors to debate him point by point.  I
am more interested in working out a left wing (white ruling class  male
academic)  take  on  the underlying  questions  than  I  am  in discussing
whether his article is "fair."
Part I presents colorblind meritocratic fundamentalism, a system of
ideas about race, merit and the proper organization of academic institu-
tions.  Fundamentalism is a critique of race-conscious  decisionmaking in
academia.  Part II presents what I call the political and cultural cases for
large-scale affirmative  action.  The political case is based on the idea that
the intelligentsias  of subordinated cultural communities should have ac-
cess to the resources  that are necessary  for groups to  exercise  effective
political power.  The cultural case is based  on the idea that a large in-
crease in the number of minority legal scholars would improve the qual-
ity and increase the social value of legal scholarship, without being unfair
to those displaced.
Part III presents a "cultural  pluralist"  understanding  of American
life, one which recognizes that there are dominant and subordinate com-
munities competing  in markets and bureaucracies.  It proposes that the
political and cultural good effect to be anticipated from affirmative action
is  the  development  within  legal  scholarship  of the  ideological  debates
that minority  intelligentsias have pursued in other fields.  Part IV takes
up the question whether  race-conscious  legal academic  decisionmaking
"derogates  from the  individuality"  of minority  scholars.  It concludes
that we  can judge  scholarship  without regard to  culture  and ideology
only if we are willing to use criteria of judgment that leave out the most
important aspects  of legal academic  accomplishment.  Part V is a brief
conclusion.
I.  COLORBLIND  MEROCRATIC  FUNDAMENTALISM
My  attitude  toward  meritocracy  grows  from my  experience  as  a
white male ruling class child who got good grades,  gained admission  to
one elite institution after another, and then landed  a job and eventually
tenure at Harvard Law School.  I belong to a group (only partly genera-
tionally  defined)  that since  some point  in  childhood  has felt  alienated
within this lived experience of working for success according to the crite-
ria pf merit that these elite institutions  administer.
tices,  legal academia  loses the sensibilities, insights, and ideas that are the products of racial oppres-
sion."  R. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1778.  See infra Part III. B.  And I agree with Richard Delgado
that we are entitled to judge with suspicion the work produced in a field like constitutional  law on
the basis of the "status,"  i.e.,  the cultural community, of the authors.  See infra Part IV.  C.
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This alienation had and has two facets.  First is a pervasive scepti-
cism  about the "standards"  according to which we have  achieved suc-
cess.  Always subject to the charge that we are simultaneously biting the
hand that feeds us and soiling the nest, we just don't believe that it is real
"merit"  that institutions measure, anywhere  in the system;  success  is a
function  of particular  knacks,  some  socially  desirable  (being  "smart")
and some not (sucking up)-and of nothing more grandiose.  This is not
rejection of the idea that some work is better than other work.  It is rejec-
tion of the institutional  mechanisms that currently  produce such judg-
ments,  of the  individuals  who  manage  the  institutions,  and  of  the
substantive outcomes.
The  second facet  is a  sense  of shame and guilt at living in unjust,
segregated racial  privilege,  combined with a sense of loss from the way
we have  been diminished  by isolation from what the subordinated  cul-'
tural communities of the U.S. might have contributed to our lives, intel-
lectual,  political  and  personal.  I might  add  that the members  of this
wholly hypothetical group have not done much (but not nothing, either)
about the situation.
These attitudes were held by a scattering of people within elite insti-
tutions, and we had little contact with people outside that milieu.  The
experience on which the reaction was and is based is limited.  It's hard to
know  whether the attitudes are really right.  It's hard to know whether
there is any alternative to the actual system that would work.
During the 1960s,  these attitudes fed into the much larger complex
of the New Left, the Movement and the Women's Movement.  The par-
ticipants came from many  different sectors  of society.  They  were male
and female, white  and black,  upper middle,  middle, and-to a limited
extent-working class.  The whole thing was over before the deep differ-
ences among them were worked into anything like coherence.  It remains
an  open  question just  how the  anti-meritocratic  alienation  I have  de-
scribed dovetails or doesn't with the attitudes of people who  come from
disadvantaged  or non-elite backgrounds.
When political alliance and real communication  between black and
white and male and female radicals fell apart in the 1970s, the project  of
working out a critique  of meritocracy  split apart too.  But before  that
happened,  there was  a counterattack,  associated  with the general  reac-
tion  against  1960s  militancy  and  specifically  addressed  to  the various
contradictory radical  critiques that had gained some currency.  This re-
action, which I call fundamentalism,  won the day.  It became one of the
ideological  legitimaters of society's retreat from messing around with es-
tablished institutions.
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Colorblind meritocratic fundamentalism is a set of ideas about race
and merit.  Like other substructures within the consciousness of a time, it
is no more than one  of many fragments  out of which people construct
their personal philosophies.  It is intrinsically neither right nor left, male
nor female, black nor white.  Fundamentalism has a long history within
American liberalism, and within orthodox Marxism, as well as within the
conservative  tradition.
A.  Fundamentalism  as a System of Ideas
Fundamentalism consists  of a set of tenets.8  Each is a slogan with
appeal  of its own.  They are rarely presented  all together.  Believers  de-
ploy  them one  by one  as the  argument may require.  Some tenets  are
about  knowledge  and  others  about  the social value  of individuals  and
their work.
l(a.)  Knowledge:
i.  Attributes of the product rather than of the producer deter-
mine the value of purported  contributions  to knowledge.
ii.  In judging the value of a product, the race, sex,  class, and
indeed all the other personal  attributes of the producer are
irrelevant  (derived from (i)).
Kennedy identifies these tenets with "the ethos of modem science." 9
The scientific ideal is linked to an image of how intellectual work is done.
l(b.)  The production  of knowledge:
i.  We produce work by individual application of talent to in-
ert matter.
ii.  The  value of the work is  a function  of the quality  of the
individual  talent that produced it rather than of the inert
matter of experience  out of which the individual formed it
(derived from (i)).
Fundamentalism  includes  the complex  of liberal  attitudes  toward
race  that  Peller  calls  integrationism,'0  but  which  seems  to me  better
called colorblindness.lI  Kennedy's article displays better than any recent
document  I  know  of  the way  meritocracy  and  colorblindness  can  be
made mutually supportive.12
For our purposes here, the important tenets of colorblindness are as
follows:
8.  This Section is indebted to Peller, supra note  1 and to Freeman,  Racism, supra note  1.
9.  R. Kennedy, supra note 3,  at 1772-73.
10.  Peller, supra note  1, at 767-71.
11.  See N. Gotanda,  A Critique of "Our  Constitution is Colorblind":  Racial Categories  and
White Supremacy  (1990)  (unpublished manuscript) (available from the author).
12.  I do not mean to  reify either.  One might be a meritocrat and also a nationalist, in Peller's
terminology,  or a person  indifferent to the racial consequences of meritocratic  processes.  Likewise,
one might favor colorblindness  and still  believe wholeheartedly  in the critique  of meritocracy.
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2(a.)  "Prejudice"  and  "discrimination"  are defined  in opposition to
"assessment  of individuals on their merits":
i.  Merit is a matter of individual traits  or products.
ii.  People are treated  irrationally  and unjustly,  in short  they
are discriminated  against, when their merit is assessed  ac-
cording to their status rather than according to the value of
their traits or products (derived  from (i)).
2(b.)  Racial discrimination  as stereotyping:
i.  There is no reason to believe that race in any of its various
socially  constructed  meanings  is  an  attribute  biologically
linked to any particular  meritorious  or discreditable intel-
lectual,  psychological  or social traits of any kind.
ii.  Racial discrimination is irrational and unjust because it de-
nies the individual  what is due him or her under the soci-
ety's agreed standards of merit (derived  from (i)).
From these  two sets of tenets,  the fundamentalist  moves  easily to
propositions about the proper institutional organization of academic (and
other) rewards  and opportunities.
3.  The institutional organization of the production of knowledge:
i.  Academic institutions  should strive to maximize  the pro-
duction of valuable knowledge  and also to reward and em-
power individual merit.
ii.  Institutions  distributing  honor  and  opportunity  should
therefore  do  so  according  to  criteria  blind  to  race,  sex,
class, and all other particularities of the individual  except
the one  particularity  of having  produced  work  of value
(derived from (i) plus  1 and 2).
B.  Colorblind  Meritocracy and Affirmative Action
Fundamentalism does not preclude adopting affirmative action pro-
grams so long as we recognize that they conflict with meritocratic alloca-
tion, and  that the sacrifice  of meritocratic  to race-based  outcomes  is a
social cost or loss.  But, in this view,  versions of affirmative action that
obscure the  cost by distorting  standards  in favor  of minorities  end  up
compounding  it.  They  go  beyond  departure  from  merit  in  particular
cases to endanger the integrity of the general system  of unbiased judg-
ment of value.
The political and cultural arguments for affirmative action I put for-
ward in the next section are consistent with fundamentalism in that they
openly abandon the use of colorblind criteria, rather than distorting them
in order to achieve  desirable results.  They do not treat race as an index
of merit  in the sense of making it a source of honor in and of itself, nor
[V/ol.  1990:705CULTURAL PLURALISM
presume  that minority  scholars  are, just by virtue of their  skin color,
"better"  scholars.'
3
There remains an important area of disagreement.  Fundamentalism
treats  a colorblind  meritocratic  system  as the ideal.  Kennedy's  article,
for example, concedes (even affirms) that our actual system departs very
far from the ideal, 1 4  but  urges  that we  should  therefore  redouble  our
commitment to purifying it:
It is true... that there are many nonracial and ameritocratic  consider-
ations that frequently enter into evaluations of a scholar's work.  The
proper  response  to  that reality,  however,  is  not  to  scrap  the  mer-
itocratic ideal.  The proper response is to abjure all practices that ex-
ploit the trappings of meritocracy to  advance interests  ...  that have
nothing to do with the intellectual  characteristics of the subject being
judged.' 5
If the concern is with racial justice, then loyalty to meritocracy sug-
gests two paths.  First, according to Kennedy, "there is nothing necessar-
ily  wrong with  race-conscious  affirmative  action"'16  if one  has  a  good
reason for it, but the reasons he imagines include neither cultural diver-
sity as an intellectual desideratum nor the recognition of the cultural and
ideological relativity of the standards that faculty members apply in dis-
tributing jobs and honors.
[Olne might fear that without a sufficient  number of minority profes-
sors a school will be beset by an intolerable degree of discord or believe
that an institution ought to make amends for its past wrongs or insist
upon taking extraordinary  measures in  order to integrate  all socially
significant institutions in American  life.17
Second, Kennedy favors attacking the underlying social conditions, par-
ticularly  the  class  stratification,  that  reduce  the  pool  of  minority
applicants."'
The point about affirmative action seen as peace making, reparations
or integration  for its  own  sake,  and  also  about increasing  the  pool  of
minority  applicants,  is that  all  of them  allow  us  to preserve  a sharp
boundary between meritocratic  decision and race-based  decision:
I simply do not want race-conscious  decisionmaking  to be naturalized
into our general pattern of academic evaluation.  I do not want  race-
conscious decisionmaking  to lose its status as a deviant mode of judg-
13.  None of the authors Kennedy criticizes take this position either.
14.  R.  Kennedy, supra note 3,  at 1806.
15.  Id  at 1807.
16.  Id
17.  Id
18.  Id at  1768,  1770,  1814 n.296.
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ing people  or the work  they  produce.  I do not want race-conscious
decisionmaking to be assimilated into our conception of meritocracy. 19
The political and cultural cases for affirmative action propose to do each
of these things.
II.  THE POLITICAL  AND  CULTURAL ARGUMENTS
FOR AFFIRMATIVE  ACTION
A.  The Political  Case
I favor large scale race-based affirmative action, using quotas if they
are necessary to produce results.  The first basis for this view is that law
school teaching positions are a small but significant part of the wealth of
the United States.  They are also a small but significant part of the polit-
ical apparatus  of the United States, by which I mean that the knowledge
law teachers produce is intrinsically political and actually effective in our
political system.  In short, legal knowledge is ideological. 20
A second basic idea is that we should be a culturally pluralist society
that deliberately  structures institutions  so that communities  and  social
classes share wealth  and power.  The sharing of wealth and power that
occur automatically,  so to speak,  through  the melting  pot, the  market
and meritocracy  are not enough,  according  to this  notion.  At  a mini-
mum, cultural pluralism means that we should structure the competition
of racial  and ethnic communities  and social  classes  in markets  and bu-
reaucracies, and in the political system, in such a way that no community
or class is systematically  subordinated.21
From these two ideas, I draw the conclusion that, completely  inde-
pendently of "merit"  as we currently  determine  it,22 there  should be a
19.  Id. at 1807.
20.  See THE POLITICS OF LAW:  A PROGRESSIVE  CRITIQUE (D. Kairys 2d ed.  1990); D. Ken-
nedy, Form and Substance in Private  Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.  L. REV.  1685  (1976)  [hereinafter
D. Kennedy, Form and Substance]; D.  Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28
BUFFALO  L.  REV. 209  (1979);  D.  KENNEDY,  LEGAL EDUCATION  AND  THE REPRODUCTION  OF
HIERARCHY:  A POLEMIC AGAINST  THE SYSTEM  14-32 (1983).
21.  See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial  Discrimination,  supra note 1; Colker, Anti-Subordination
Above All:  Sex, Race, and Equal  Protection, 61 N.Y.U.  L. REV.  1003  (1986);  R. Kennedy, Persua-
sion and Distrust: A  Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV.  L. REV.  1327,  1335-36
(1986)  [hereinafter R. Kennedy, Persuasion  and  Distrust];  R. Kennedy, McCleskey  v. Kemp:  Race,
Capital  Punishment,  and the Supreme Court, 101  HARV.  L. REV.  1388,  1424 (1988);  C. MACKIN-
NON,  FEMINISM  UNMODIFIED:  DISCOURSES  ON  LIFE  AND  LAW  32-45  (1987);  Olsen,  Statutory
Rape: A Feminist  Critique of  RightsAnalysis, 63 Tnx. L. REv. 387, 390-401, 429-30 (1984);  Ansley,
supra note 5, at  1063-64.
22.  "Independently of 'merit'"  means regardless of whether the candidates in question would
be hired or promoted if the law schools applied their current standards without taking affirmative
action goals into account.  I put the word "merit" in quotation marks because, in my twenty years as
a law school faculty member, I have quite consistently found myself voting "on  the merits," without
regard  to affirmative action,  for minority  teaching candidates  who did not get the job and against
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substantial representation  of all numerically significant minority commu-
nities  on American  law  faculties.  The analogy  is to' the right to vote,
which we refuse to distribute  on the basis of merit, and to the right of
free  speech, which we refuse to limit to those who  deserve to speak  or
whose  speech has  merit.  The value  at stake  is community rather  than
individual empowerment.  In the case of affirmative action, as in those of
voting and free speech, the goal is political, and  prior to the achievement
of  enlightenment  or the  reward  of  "merit"  as  determined  by  existing
institutions.
Race is, at present, a rough but adequate proxy for connection to a
subordinated community,  one that avoids institutional judgments  about
the cultural identity of particular candidates.  I would use it for this rea-
son only, not because race is itself an index of merit, and in spite of its
culturally constructed character and the arbitrariness involved in using it
as a predicter of the traits of any particular individual.  My argument is
thus addressed to only one of the multiple forms of group subordination,
though it could  be extended  to gender,  sexual  preference,  social class,
and ethnicity within the "white community. '23
The political argument includes the idea that minority communities
can't compete  effectively  for wealth  and  power  without intelligentsias
that produce  the kinds of knowledge,  especially  political or ideological
knowledge,  that will help  them  get what they  want.  To  do this,  they
need or at least could use some number of legal academic jobs.  It also
includes  the idea  that cultural  diversity  and  cultural  development  are
white candidates who did. This means that I disagree with my own school's institutional application
of the merit standard before we even get to questions of affirmative action.  Extensive indirect expo-
sure to hiring and promotion decisions  at a range of other schools suggests to me that they are not
different.  I would  say most law school faculties  give too much weight  to paper  credentials, over-
value old-boy connections,  make bad intuitive judgments based  on interviews, and tend to misevalu-
ate the  substantive quality  of presentations and written  work when  applying  formally  colorblind
standards.  For these reasons,  the current institutional  interpretation of standards  yields no more
than a very loose approximation  of what I myself regard  as merit.  For a somewhat different but I
think accurate critique of elite law school hiring, see Carter,  The Best Black; and Other Tales  I
RECONSTRUCTION  6 (1990).  For a critique  of Carter, see infra Part IV.  D.  See also Bartholet,
Application of Title  VII to Jobs in High Places, 95  HARV.  L. REv. 945  (1982).
23.  Cf Appiah,  The  Uncompleted Argument:  Du Bois and the Illusion of Race, in  "RACE,"
WRITING AND  DIFFERENCE 21 (H. Gates ed.  1986).  I see the groupings that Americans identify as
"racial,"  such as the black, Hispanic, Asian-American, or Native American communities as different
from communities  characterized  as "ethnic,"  such  as  the Irish-American,  Italian-American,  etc.
The difference I am asserting derives not from the biology of group members, but from their different
places in the American  ideology of racial and group identity and from the historic practice of differ-
ential  treatment  in the  context of subordination.  See W.  JORDAN,  THE WHITE  MAN'S  BURDEN:
HISTORICAL  ORIGINS  OF  RACISM  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  (1974);  G.  FREDRICKSON,  WHITE
SUPREMACY:  A  COMPARATIVE  STUDY  IN  AMERICAN AND  SOUTH  AFRICAN  HISTORY  (1981);  N.
Gotanda, supra note  11.
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good  in themselves,  even when they do not lead to increased power for
subordinated  communities in markets and political systems.
The political case is complicated by the fact that when law faculties
distribute jobs  in  legal  academia,  they  do more than distribute  wealth
and the power to participate in politics through the production of ideol-
ogy.  They also distribute power to influence who will participate in the
future, because those they choose will vote on those decisions.  In decid-
ing who to hire or promote according to colorblind criteria, law faculties
make culturally and ideologically contingent judgments about what can-
didates  are most promising  or deserving, and about who  should  make
these very judgments  in the future.  Given the ideological  and  cultural
character of these choices, and their (limited but significant) political im-
pact,  white  males have  no more business  monopolizing  the process  of
distributing  the  benefits  than  they  have  monopolizing  the  benefits
themselves. 24
A  serious obstacle to this  proposal  is the "pool  problem." 25  The
number of minority teaching  candidates is limited, and the prospects for
the future are clouded by the decline in the number of black college grad-
uates.  (The situation is different for each  cultural community.)  I would
therefore limit affirmative  action by imposing a floor or cut-off point in
the form of a requirement of minimum actual or anticipated competence
in performing the instructional function of a law professor.26
24.  This is not  a "reparations"  argument for affirmative  action, since it is not dependent  on
establishing for any particular cultural community that a history of racial oppression justifies special
measures in the present.  The idea  is that if the politically dominant groups decide to annex,  trans-
port, or  admit into  the United  States large  numbers of people who  form a subordinated  cultural
community, then they should make sure those people have the resources  to function in the national
political arena.  But the argument is not averse to reparations, and I favor them where there has been
a history of oppression.  For a reparations  argument,  see Matsuda, Looking to  the Bottom, supra
note 4.
25.  See R.  Kennedy, supra note 3,  at 1765-70.
26.  Incorporating a floor into the proposal means that faculties that decide to adopt it will have
to negotiate over what should be considered minimum qualifications.  If a faculty set the floor very
high, the result would  be little change in existing practices, since all but the candidates  who would
have been considered  anyway would be excluded.  For the proposal  to have an impact, the faculty
adopting it would  have to intend to change its practices by identifying  a significant  pool of candi-
dates of color considered minimally  qualified,  and then choosing "the best"  from among  them until
the faculty had achieved a reasonable representation of minorities.  The terms "reasonable represen-
tation"  and "minimum  qualifications"  are vague, but this  does not seem  to me a drawback to the
proposal.  We are  talking about changes at the level  of particular  law faculties  rather than about
legislation or administrative or even Association of American Law Schools (AALS)  guidelines.  No
faculty would adopt the proposal unless there was a majority committed to a quite radical change in
existing practices.  That majority could choose to define the new policy much more specifically,  say
in terms of quotas and lists of credentials, rather than leave it vague.  But another faculty might see
the vagueness  of the standard  as valuable  for "equitable  flexibility"  rather  than viewing  it  as a
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It would  seem  to me  a problem  (requiring tradeoffs) if the imple-
mentation  of this  view  would be unfair  to individual  whites  excluded
from teaching jobs, or if it would lead to a decline in the quality of legal
scholarship.  But I believe that massive affirmative  action would not be
unfair to excluded whites, and that it would improve the quality of legal
scholarship  as I assess it.  It would also have, I think, a beneficial effect
on the quality of life, by undermining  the fetishistic, neurotic  and just
plain  irrational  attitude  toward  "standards"  and  merit-based  "entitle-
ment" that prevails in legal  academia.
B.  Affirmative Action and the Quality of Work
The standards that law  schools apply in  deciding who  to hire and
who to promote function to exclude scholars from cultural communities
with a history of subordination.  Because we exclude them, we get contri-
butions to legal knowledge from only a small number of people with ties
to those communities.  I believe that if there were a lot more such people,
they would make contributions that, taken as a whole, would have a cul-
turally  specific character.  Judging  by my own  culturally and  ideologi-
cally contingent standards, I think they would produce outstanding work
not otherwise available.  Law schools would do better to invest resources
in evoking this contribution than in the fungible white male candidates at
the margin who  get jobs under the existing selection  systems.  (Though
quite a few who appear marginal turn out to be terrific.)
I  don't  mean  that there  would  be  a minority  "line."  But  there
would be a variety of positions, debates and styles of legal academic writ-
ing that everyone would  identify as resulting  from the rise of minority
legal culture.  Some of these debates, positions and styles would be pro-
duced by whites, but no less a product of change in the racial makeup of
the academy.  Some of the new work would certainly look wrong or me-
diocre to me.  But some would knock our socks  off, in unexpected ways
and in ways already presaged by Critical Race Theory.27  I have no doubt
that in terms of the social and intellectual value of scholarly output, legal
The floor, as I define it in the text, refers only to instructional functions of the law professor.  I
would leave writing out altogether, for at least three reasons.  First, existing criteria of merit do not
seem to me either to predict or to reward expost the particular qualities that make for what I regard
as scholarly excellence.  Second, arbitrariness and ideological  disagreement about what scholarship
is good scholarship chill the academic  freedom and undermine the quality of life of candidates  and
assistant professors.  Third, since the rationale of the proposal  is partly political  empowerment  of
cultural communities that are subordinated  by the dominant white community, it is undesirable to
invite the white male majorities of our law faculties  to engage in exclusion from the pool of "mini-
mally qualified"  scholars of color according  to criteria of "quality"  that have  a heavy ideological
load.
27.  See supra notes  4 & 5.
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academia  would be  better  off than  it  is  now.  We  have  lost  a  lot by
preventing minorities from making this contribution.  We can't get it un-
less we give them the resources, in  the form of legal academic jobs, to
make it.
Second, I think some legal scholarship is exciting and enriching and
stimulating, but that's not very much.  People seem to produce the good
stuff through neurotic, often dramatic processes,  full of twists and turns
and surprises.  I think most legal scholarship is pretty much done by the
numbers,  and it's hard to make any sharp  quality  differential  between
articles.  This stuff is useful.  Writing it is hard work.  But it doesn't take
deep scholarly quality.  There are many, many people who are excluded
by the "standards"  from teaching law who could do it as well or as medi-
ocrely as those who do it in fact.  For this reason, I think we would lose
little in  the way of quality  even if massive  affirmative  action failed  to
produce  the rich harvest of new ideas and approaches that I anticipate.
The  possibility  of (dramatically)  improving  legal  scholarship  pro-
vides a second strong reason for a massive affirmative action program.  It
is not just that there is no trade-off between quality and affirmative ac-
tion.  The existing system denies us a benefit.  Even in the absence of the
political justification,  I would favor a new system on this ground.28
C.  Affirmative Action and White Entitlements
Suppose  a law  faculty adopts this version of affirmative  action be-
cause it hopes to improve the quality of legal academic work, as well as
because it is politically  more just.  When  the faculty  prefers a minority
job applicant over a white even though the present system would give the
job to the white, it does so, in part, because it thinks that in the long run
this  approach  will improve  scholarship and  teaching.  We  are treating
race as a credential  (as a proxy for culture and community) because we
28.  Yet a third important reason for affirmative action is that it will improve the quality of legal
pedagogy.  The political case anticipates  that increasing  the  number of law teachers  of color  will
influence the experience  of law students of color in directions that will empower subordinated  com-
munities.  This  is  a  part  of  the  general  strategy  of building  minority  intelligentsias  so  that
subordinated communities can participate effectively in the political process.  The cultural  case an-
ticipates that scholars of color will have an impact on the substantive content of what is taught about
particular  legal  issues and  on the composition  of the curriculum  and on  the syllabi of particular
courses.  In all these areas, "white  moderate" bias is rampant, by which I mean that white moderate
ideological blinders render minority issues invisible.  But affirmative action is also important to im-
prove the educational experience  and the practical  value of legal education for people of color.  The
availability of "role models"  is only a part of what is at issue here.  Improvements should derive in
part directly  from what minority teachers  do in and out of the classroom,  and in part from their
influence on  what white teachers  do.  And the benefits should  run to white students  as well as to
students of color. See Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a  Race-Conscious  Pedagogy  in Legal Education,
11  NAT'L BLAcK  L.J. 1 (1989);  cf Lopez, supra note 5.
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anticipate  terrific  work  from  some  of these  applicants,  work that  we
don't think we  can  get from the whites they replace.  The  reason we
don't expect it from them is that we believe that work from authors with
ties  to  subordinated  communities  is  likely  to  have  different  excellent
qualities from work from inside the dominant community.
Are the excluded  whites "entitled"  to prevent this improvement  in
scholarship?  I would say they are not.  Even if all the colorblind criteria
of academic promise that we can think of favor a white candidate, he or
she lacks something we want in some substantial number of those we will
hire.  He  or  she  has less  promise  of doing  work  with  the  particular
strengths  likely to  derive  from  connection  to  a subordinated  cultural
community.
The white male law teaching applicant whose resume and interviews
would  get him the job were it not for affirmative  action has indeed ac-
complished something, and will not be rewarded for it with the job.  But
if he understands in advance that the terms of the competition are that he
is competing  against other white males, for the limited number of slots
that a politically just system makes available to people who have had his
advantages, then I don't think he has any reason to complain when a job
he would have gotten under a different (less just) system goes to a minor-
ity applicant.  But the excluded white candidates do not have as strong a
claim as assumed above.
First, those who win out in the existing system have no claim to be
"the best,"  even according to the colorblind criteria, because  the under-
lying  systems  of race  and  class  and  the system  of testing  excludes  so
many potential competitors from the very beginning.  The competition in
which  our  teaching  applicants  and  tenure  candidates  win  out  is  re-
stricted, with only a tiny number of notable  exceptions,  to people born
within a certain race-class  distance of those positions.  At every step, the
differences  in  educational  resources  and the testing process  screen  out
millions of people who might be able to do the job of law professor better
than those who  end  up getting it.  As against  those excluded  from the
competition  by  race  and  class  and  the vagaries  of the testing  system,
those who win out have only a very limited claim of entitlement.
Second,  the "standards"  that law schools  apply in  hiring assistant
professors and promoting them to tenure are at best very rough proxies
for accomplishment  as we assess it after the fact.  People who get good
grades and have prestigious clerkships often turn out to be duds as legal
scholars  and teachers  by the  standards  of those  who  appointed  them.
People with less impressive resumes  often turn out to be terrific scholars
and teachers.  People who get tenure on the basis of an article that looks
good to the tenure committee (and those of the faculty who read it) often
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never  produce  anything  of  comparable  quality  again.  "Entitlements"
based  on these rough  proxies  are worthy of only limited  respect.  The
white males who  would be displaced to make way for large numbers of
minority scholars would be hurt, but not in a way that would be unfair,
given the importance of the goals to be achieved. 29
Third, law  school faculties apply  a pedestrian,  often philistine cul-
tural standard in judging white male resumes,  interviews and presenta-
tions at the entry level, and white male teaching and tenure work at the
promotion  level.  They  administer  this  pedestrian,  philistine  standard
with an unconscious but unmistakable  moderate conservative to moder-
ate liberal bias.  And they serve it up with a powerful  seasoning of old-
boyism  and  arbitrary  clique  preference  as between  white  males.  This
doesn't mean  a more pluralist  academy would  necessarily  do better  or
produce  more political diversity.  It does mean for me that there  is an
element of laughable exaggeration  in the claims often made for the mer-
itocratic purity of existing arrangements.  The people who would win out
in this system were it not for affirmative  action have weak claims of un-
fairness just because they are not so wonderful, even by comparison with
other white males, that they can regard themselves as innocent  victims.
29.  The mainly white male candidates who win jobs and tenure under the existing system do so
through a difficult, effortful, often draining process of academic competition, before and during law
school.  The criteria of success,  mainly getting good grades on exams, writing good student papers,
and making professors think you are intelligent and "sound"  (not too far out of the political main-
stream) have real bite.  I do not see them as arbitrary in the sense that there is enormous variance in
how different professors  evaluate a given student, or that just anyone  can do  equally well, or that
grades are random.  But the fact that there is a difficult process of selection does not mean we should
regard  those who get through the screening as having "merit"  that "entitles"  them to the jobs we
offer.
The undergraduate and law school work that qualifies students for jobs usually has no academic
"merit"  in the sense  of making permanent  contributions to knowledge.  Its function  is to develop
skills that will pay off, if they do pay off, later on.  Possession of the skills is no guarantee of success,
and people  who have less skill at the competition  often produce better work in the end than those
with more.  The academic  performances  that get one into law school  and then into the legal  aca-
demic job market are at best a weak proxy for the merit of actually producing valuable legal scholar-
ship or teaching.
Even the criteria we apply in granting tenure are no more than  proxies for merit in the lifetime
careers we are distributing.  We grant future job security on the basis of past performance,  without
subsequent readjustment  if the candidate turns  out to lack merit over the coming  decades.  We do
reward actual academic merit, but we do it through the process of lateral appointment up the pres-
tige ladder, through the distribution of high reputation  and by academic honors and prizes.
In short, the white male applicant is in a very different situation than the white male author of a
law review  article rejected  because the editors  accepted  an article by a black that has no  claim to
cultural distinctiveness  and is "not as good"  by colorblind  standards as his.  Even in this case, the
decision may be justified as an investment by the white community  in developing  minority scholars
who may eventually use the resources generated by publication  to produce distinctive  work, and as
the distribution of a share of the social power represented  by publication to people who have tradi-
tionally been  excluded.  But the case is harder because  we are dealing  with a direct judgment  of
scholarly merit rather than with a proxy.CULTURAL  PLURALISM
There is no trade-off between racial justice and legal academic qual-
ity.  Indeed, both goals point in the same direction.  There is no claim of
entitlement against these goals even for candidates who are plausibly the
best by every colorblind criterion.  The actual candidates  likely to be re-
jected have claims weakened by exclusion of competitors, especially com-
petitors  from the groups that would  gain by  affirmative  action.  Their
claims are further weakened by the fact that their  accomplishments are
mere proxies for legal academic  merit, and by the low  cultural quality
and arbitrary subjectivism of the screening system that would otherwise
have delivered them the goods.
D.  Destabilizing  Attitudes about Race and Merit
It would be a beneficial side effect of massive, politically and cultur-
ally grounded affirmative  action if it upset or destabilized  the way most
law teachers experience  the whole issue of merit, and especially its rela-
tionship to race.  One of the least attractive traits associated with funda-
mentalism is the tendency to fetishize "credentials"  that are only proxies
for actual achievement.  See the case of the academic who wants the law
school transcript of a candidate for a teaching job who is thirty-five years
old and has written four law review articles and taught several thousand
law students.
But this is just the extreme case.  We are generally  too dependent
on,  even addicted to, the continual reward of being told  we are better,
and that our law schools are better, according to an objective merit scale,
than other people and law schools.  And as a group we are  excessively
susceptible  to injury by judgments that we fall below others.  Addictive
concern with pellets of meritocratic praise and blame manifests itself in
neurotic vices.
The most striking of these is resentment, intense preoccupation with
the ways in which one has been unjustly denied the praise or job or honor
that one's  "merit"  "entitles"  one to, and with the ways  in which others
have received more than their due.  A second vice is careerism  or oppor-
tunism, in which an interest in climbing the ladder or maximizing one's
academic  capital comes  to dominate attachment to any  set of ideas or
any set of autonomous judgments  about others.
On the flip side, obsession with merit funnels emotional energy into
generating  distinctions that will justify the claim that differences  in peo-
ple's rewards and punishments are deserved rather than arbitrary.  Some-
times  we just can't admit that  our standards  lack  power to make  the
distinctions  that law school  roles require  of us,  among students  or job
applicants or tenure candidates.  Intensely debated but meaningless small
distinctions  at the margin allow us to imagine that merit is  ruling the
Vol.  1990.705]DUKE LAW JOURNAL
day,  so that no one has been wronged,  when the distinctions that have
real meaning are too crude to do the job.
Sometimes  what  we are  denying  is that merit is  only  part  of the
story of colleagueship.  The torturing of standards until they confess that
"he  got what he deserved"  may be a cover-up  for other  motives.  The
hypertrophy of standards-talk  also has a narcissistic payoff, since it end-
lessly reaffirms the merit of those who  make judgments of merit.30
Affirmative action has already somewhat destabilized these neurotic
patterns.  They might be further jarred by an explicitly political and cul-
turally based increase, because everyone involved in the enterprise would
be forced to recognize a degree of relativity to the idea of merit.  Dissoci-
ating  some hiring and  promotion  decisions  from any  particular set  of
credentials undermines everyone's sense that their true being is their aca-
demic capital.
A political move to large  scale affirmative action would say to mi-
norities, "Here is a part of the resources.  Do what you can with it."  It
would  free whites from  some of the political  obligation  that comes  of
unjust treatment of minorities.  It would reduce  the nagging  sense that
our ability to assess merit is consciously or unconsciously  corrupted be-
cause we now accomplish limited power and wealth sharing through aca-
demic decisions on hiring and promotion.
It would  reduce the sense that we coerce minorities who want the
rewards  we  have to  offer into  "being  like us."  It would  also  increase
integration,  the chance  for more relations  with  minorities in  our  own
workplaces.  But it would do this without presupposing that our "merit"
joins us together in a way that is "more important than" or "independent
of"  cultural  community.  In short, it might promote integration  while
undermining  the ideology  of colorblindness.
There are obvious dangers.  The proposal might increase  the stere-
otyping  of minorities  as  intellectually  inferior.  It might  lead  to  pro-
tracted, destructive racial conflict between majority and minority groups
on faculties, and within those groups.  It might be impossible to design a
scheme of wealth and power sharing that would be easy to administer so
as to avoid endless  conflict  about how to define it in practice.  I don't
deny these dangers.  I just think them worth  risking, given the possible
benefits.
The proposal  obviously  contemplates  race-conscious  decisionmak-
ing as a routine, non-deviant  mode, a more or less permanent  norm in
30.  That these vices are widespread does not invalidate meritocracy.  They may be present in
valuable meritocratic  systems and in corrupt ones,  or largely absent in either type.  I am asserting
that they are distressingly prevalent in our system and constitute a significant cost of doing business
the way we do.
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distributing legal academic jobs.  A "racial distinctiveness" theory (actu-
ally cultural distinctiveness) combined with race-conscious decisionmak-
ing is "assimilated  into our conception  of meritocracy,"'31 which  is just
what  Kennedy's  article  urges  us to avoid at  all costs.  The  position  is
problematic  as well  as controversial, because it relies on the idea of cul-
tural  subordination,  rather  than  on the  more  familiar  fundamentalist
ideas of prejudice  and discrimination.32
III.  THE CULTURAL  SUBORDINATION  THESIS
The  issue is  whether  there  is  enough  cultural  distinctiveness,  and
enough subordination and exclusion,  so that we must treat representation
in academia as a political question, and so that we can expect major intel-
lectual  gains from doing So.33 The  argument thus far has been largely
hypothetical.  Even  if one accepted  the value  of the notions of culture
and ideology, one might deny that, in the actual conditions of the United
States in 1990, cultural and ideological  differences are significant.  Or one
might merely deny that they are large enough so that we need to struc-
ture law schools to take them into account.34
The cultural pluralist position to the contrary rests on a whole com-
plex of ideas about American  society.  I am going to introduce them in
31.  R.  Kennedy, supra note 3,  at 1807.
32.  It  is an interesting question, but one I will not deal  with in this Article,  whether the pro-
posed program violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution or Title VII  of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968,  as they are currently  interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
See D. BELL, The Racial Barrier  to Reparations, in AND  WE ARE NOT SAVED supra note 4, at 123-
39.  See generally Sullivan, Sins of  Discrimination:  Last Tern's  Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV.
L.  REV. 78  (1986)  (arguing that affirmative action can be justified with "forward-looking"  goals of
an integrated future rather than solely for past sins); Brest, Affirmative Action and the Constitution:
Three Theories, 72 IowA  L. REv. 281  (1987)  (analyzing  "original  intent,"  "discrete  and  insular
minorities"  and "color-blind  equality"  approaches to affirmative action).
33.  The tone of Kennedy's article is unrelentingly hostile to the "racial  distinctiveness"  thesis,
but surprisingly unhelpful in assessing it.  He writes as if it must mean either that there is a single
minority or black or Hispanic "voice,"  or that anything any minority person says is said in a minor-
ity voice.  He suggests (note irony) that we should develop a definition of what a meritorious black
voice is, and then apply colorblind  criteria in judging whether candidates have it, or that we should
just abandon  the idea altogether.  See R. Kennedy, supra note  3,  at  1802-03.  As indicated  in the
text following this note, the issue seems to me a good deal more complicated than his position makes
it seem.
34.  Randall Kennedy, and I think most others of his camp, is not willing to go that far.  At a
number of points, his article recognizes,  tentatively, one might even say grudgingly, that the groups
that make up our society have differing  characteristics and that under some circumstances  it might
make sense to take them into account:
[E]ven taking into account class, gender, and other divisions, there might remain an irre-
ducible link of commonality  in the experience  of people of color:  rich  or poor,  male or
female, learned or ignorant, all people of color are to some degree "outsiders"  in a society
that  is intensely color-conscious and  in which the hegemony of whites  is overwhelming.
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highly  schematic form.  Together they define a variant of the "national-
ist" ideology.
35
A.  Premises of Cultural  Pluralism
Groups exist in a sense that goes beyond individuals having similar
traits.  People act together, in the strong sense of working out common
goals  and  then engaging  in a  cooperative  process  of trying to  achieve
them.  Just as important, they engage in discussion and mutual criticism
both about the goals and about what group members  are doing (or not
doing) to achieve them.  This is true of small task-oriented groups (fam-
ily members  getting the car packed for a trip), and also of large, diffuse
groups, like "the black community,"  or a law faculty.
An important human reality is the experience of defining oneself as
"a member of a group" in this strong sense of sharing goals and a discur-
sive practice.  Another important experience is being  treated by others as
a group member.  One's interlocutor interprets what one says and does as
derived  from a shared  project.  We all  constantly  identify groups  and
their members, assuming that we need  to in order to understand  other
people and predict what they will do.36
I do not maintain that no appreciable  differences exist in the prevailing opinions and sensi-
bilities of various racial  groups.  Nor do I maintain that it is improper ever to make deci-
sions based on racial generalizations.
Id  at 1816  (footnote omitted).  See also id  at  1805  n.271  (noting that in some cases the "fact  of
being black-like that of being tall, being able to see, or simply being alive-may help one to accom-
plish something admirable").  There  is black literature, music, film,  in the sense of contributions  of
individuals who happen to be black, id  at 1758-59, but no "black art" in a stronger sense, id. at 1803
& n.262.  There are patterns of behavior and particular opinions (e.g.,  opposition  to the death pen-
alty, i  d  at 1816)  that characterize one ethnic subculture  more than another.  It  is even  true that
"racial and other ascriptive loyalties continue to organize a great deal of social, political and intellec-
tual life throughout the world, in many areas such loyalties have intensified."  Id.  at 1782 (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).  When talking about the production  of academic  knowledge, the  article
places the burden of proof on the person who would assert that membership in a defined community
is associated  with  a particular  way of knowing or with particular  intellectual  strengths or weak-
nesses.  The crucial question in the debate about standards  is:
But what, as a function of  race, is "special"  or "distinct"  about the scholarship of minority
legal academics?  Does  it differ  discernibly in ways  attributable  to race from work pro-
duced by  white scholars?  If so, in what ways  and to what  degree is the work of colored
intellectuals different from or better than the work of whites?...  [A]t least with respect to
legal scholarship,  [Matsuda]  fails to show the newness of the "new  knowledge"  and the
difference that distinguishes  the  "different  voices."
Id  at  1778-79.  It  seems to me  unlikely  that we  will  get far by  trying to resolve the substantive
dispute by the placement of  the burden of proof. If we take the idea of proof seriously, then whoever
bears the burden will lose.  The decision to allocate the burden to one side or the  other is no less
ideological than a decision  on the merits.
35.  Peller, supra note 1.
36.  J.-P.  SARTRF,  CRITQUE  OF  DIALEcrcAL  REASON  I:  THEORY  OF PRACTICAL  ENSEM-
BLES (A. Sheridan-Smith  trans.  1976).CULTURAL PLURALISM
Communities are more than mere statistical groupings of individuals
with particular traits, but less than self-organized groups.  Membership
presupposes  interaction,  but the  interaction  may be  sporadic,  routine,
alienated.  A community  is an  historically  specific  collection of people
with a  common past,  and a future  that will  take place  on the basis  of
what has gone before.  That basis  can be reinterpreted  but not obliter-
ated.  We are stuck, at any given moment, in the communities we started
or ended in, and that is never "just anywhere."  Wherever it is, it is both
more inert than a self-organized group and less demanding.  The crucial
idea is that communities are made up of living individuals, but they have
an element of trans-individual stability and particularity; to be a member
is to be situated, and you can be situated only in one or two places at a
time.  Membership is limiting as well as empowering.
Communities have cultures.  This means that individuals have traits
that are neither genetically determined nor voluntarily chosen, but rather
consciously and unconsciously taught through community life.  Commu-
nity life forms  customs and habits,  capacities to produce  linguistic and
other  performances,  and  individual  understandings  of good  and  bad,
true and false, worthy and unworthy.  Culture is first of all a product of
community.  People  living  in  different  groups  possess  different  under-
standings of value as well as exhibiting different capacities and behavior
traits (kinship, cooking, dress).  But as I am using it, culture is a charac-
teristic of an individual as well.  You can break all your ties to a commu-
nity yet remain a person with that community's  cultural identity.3 7
A large part of the population of the United States lives in racial and
ethnic communities that have a measure of cultural distinctiveness.  The
distinctiveness  comes  in part  from the origins  in Africa,  Asia, Europe
and Latin America of the different groups that live here.  But the cultures
of particular communities have been dramatically transformed by the ex-
perience of immigration, forced transportation or annexation, and by the
heterogeneous  cultural life of this country.  Each group has put its cul-
ture  of origin  together  with  its  peculiar  circumstances  in  the  United
States  to  produce  a  distinct  set  of  behaviors,  attitudes,  beliefs  and
values.
38
The racial and ethnic communities of the United States are in con-
stant contact with one another.  This contact is asymmetrical.  There is a
dominant cultural community  which is less  influenced by and less con-
37.  See generally J.  CLIFFORD, THE  PREDICAMENT  OF  CULTURE:  TWENTIETH-CENTURY
ETHNORAPHY,  LrrERATURE  AND  ART (1988).
38.  See D. Kennedy, Radical  Intellectuals in American Culture and Politics,  or My Talk at the
Gramsci  Institute,  RETHINKING MARXISM, Fall  1988, at 100, 129; A. Ross, No REsPECr:  INTEL-
LECTUALS  AND  PoPULAR CuLTURE (1989).
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scious of the subordinated  groups than they are influenced by and con-
scious of it.  As a result, it is hard to ideutify any aspect of the cultures of
subordinated  groups that might be relevant to academic production that
has not been influenced  by contact with the dominant culture.
The boundaries of cultural communities are blurred by the presence
of large numbers of people who can trace their family history back into a
subordinated  community, but who  now  regard themselves  and  are re-
garded by others as situated in a culturally intermediate  space, or as as-
similated  to the  dominant  culture.  There  are  millions  of people  for
whom the "authenticity"  of having always belonged to a relatively homo-
geneous community with an unselfconsciously shared ethos is simply im-
possible.  Most  of those likely  to  benefit  by  a  program  of  culturally-
conscious  distribution  of academic  power and  opportunity  come  from
these intermediate, multi-cultural positions.  (The existence of this group
may make it more likely that we could actually succeed in implementing
cultural diversity.)
Though communities are different in ways that are best understood
through  the non-hierarchical,  neutral idea  of culture  (some  groups  do
things  one way,  value one  set of things,  other groups do it in different
ways), some differences are not like that.  Americans pursue their collec-
tive and individual projects in a situation of group domination and group
subordination.  By this I mean that we can compare "how well" different
groups have done with regard to income, housing, health, education, lo-
cal  and national political  power, and access to cultural resources.  The
groups are not so different that they define these things in  radically  dif-
ferent ways,  or that some groups are just not interested in them.  With
respect to these common measures of equality and inequality, we all rec-
ognize that some groups are enormously better off than others.
The experiences of youth within a particular community, or on the
border between communities,  equip individuals with resources for com-
petition in markets and bureaucracies.  Different communities have  dif-
ferent access to wealth and power with which to endow their members.
And the rules of competition in markets and bureaucracies are structured
in ways (both formal and informal) that advantage  people from different
communities regardless of the resources they bring as individuals to the
competition.
Some of these advantages are  overtly or covertly correlated  to the
community membership  of the people competing.  Historically, the white
community  imposed  systematic  race-based  discrimination,  outright job
and housing  segregation,  and rules that excluded  racial  minorities and
women from directly exercising political power.  In the current situation,
particular  cultural  groups  control  or  dominate  some  markets and  bu-
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players  are functions  of the game,  as  well  as  vice  versa.  There  is  no
"outside  position."  Communities  themselves  change  internally  and
through collision with other communities, but the process has  as much
fate, drift and chance mutation to it as it does mechanical  necessity  or
self-organized  group will.  Communities  can disperse  or  assimilate  and
then re-form, and they can die out or be killed.41
The American  racial  and  ethnic  communities  have  intelligentsias,
linked in  overlapping  patterns  to a national  intelligentsia  and  to  each
other.  By an .intelligentsia, I mean a "knowledge class"  working  in edu-
cation, the arts, social  work, the law, religion, the media,  therapy,  con-
sulting,  and  myriad  spin-offs  like  charitable  foundations,  for-profit
research ventures, and the like.  Intelligentsia members perform  multiple
functions  beyond  their  formal  job  descriptions.  In  self-organizing
groups or individually, some of them work at defining their community's
identity (its cultural distinctiveness) or lack thereof, its interests in com-
petition  and  cooperation  with  other  communities,  and  its  possible
strategies.42
The national, racial and ethnic intelligentsias are internally  divided
along  ideological  lines.  One national  ideological  axis  is  radical-liberal-
moderate-conservative-rightwing.  Another  is  traditional-modern-
postmodern.  Another  is  science-social  science-humanities-arts.  There
are also a wide range of ideological debates within particular intelligen-
tsias, for example  about their relationship to the national  community.
An ideology in the sense in which I am using it is a set of contested
ideas that provides  a  "partisan"  interpretation  (descriptive  and norma-
tive) of a field of social conflict.43  The social conflict could be between
capital and labor, farmers and banks, men and women, gay and straight,
North and  South,  native born and foreign  born,  export  industries  and
import industries,  or whatever.  The  concepts  that describe  and justify
the positions of the conflicting  groups  can be drawn from  almost  any-
where, from philosophy to economics  to religion to biology;  within the
fields that we use ideologically, complex systems of contested ideas reflect
and at the same time influence social conflict.44
Ideologists choose their ideas, in the sense that there is no consensus
either in their favor or against them.  Many people may think a particu-
41.  See D. KENNEDY,  The Politics  of  Hierarchy, in LEGAL EDUCATION  AND THE REPRODUC-
TION OF  HIERARCHY, supra note  20, at 78-97.
42.  See generally  A.  GRAMSCi,  SELECTIONS  FROM  THE PRISON  NOTEBOOKS  (Q. Hoare & G.
Smith eds.  1971).
43.  See generally K.  MANNHEIM,  IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA:  AN INTRODUCTION  TO THE SOCI-
OLOGY  OF KNOWLEDGE (1954).
44.  See generally L. ALTHUSSER,  Ideology and  Ideological  State  Apparatuses (Notes towards an
Investigation), in LENIN  AND  PHILOSOPHY  AND  OTHER ESSAYS  127  (B. Brewster  trans.  1971).
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lar  system  is  objectively  right  and  many  others  that  it is  objectively
wrong, or it may be seen as posing a question you can only resolve by a
leap of faith.  The most basic critique of the ideologist  is that she  has
chosen her ideas to fit her partisan allegiance,  and therefore lacks  alle-
giance to "truth."  In the conception  of ideology I am using, this must
always be recognized as a possibility.  People do sometimes distort their
intellectual work to serve causes or interests they adhere to.  At the same
time we have to recognize  that where  there is social  conflict  and  con-
tested  interpretations  of that  conflict,  there  is  no  intellectual  space
outside of ideology.  Intelligentsia virtue consists not in "objectivity"  or
"neutrality,"  which are impossible once there is ideological  division, but
in the attempt to empower  an audience to judge for itself.
It  follows  that  being  an  ideologist  doesn't  mean  being  closed
minded, or uninterested in questioning fundamental assumptions, or be-
ing blind to evidence that contradicts those assumptions.  In this sense of
the term, one is in the position of the ideologist just by virtue of having,
at any given moment, made choices between contested  views that influ-
ence the intellectual work one does (and are influenced by it).  "Moder-
ates"  are  ideologists  because  when  they  call  themselves  that  they
implicitly appeal to a controversial critique of "ideologues."  (This is the
ideology  of moderation.)
Members of minority intelligentsias are linked to their cultural com-
munities in various ways,  and divided from them as well, usually by so-
cial  class,  income,  intelligentsia  interests,  and  links  to  the  national
intelligentsia  and culture that are  different from those of the "masses."
A  basic  ideological  conflict  is  over  how  to  describe  and  evaluate  the
courses of conduct that intelligentsia  members  adopt  in this  situation.
There are ideologies of assimilation and of authenticity, of group accom-
modation  and of group  resistance,  of individual  self-realization  and  of
collective obligation,  and so forth.
The existence of ethnic intelligentsias, their size, and the power they
produce for communities, all depend on access to resources, as does their
ability to contribute to national intellectual/political life.  One index of a
community's cultural subordination is dependence  on others to produce
knowledge in areas where it would seem, at least superficially, that com-
munity interests will be affected by what that knowledge  is.  Another  is
inability of its intelligentsia to  influence the national intelligentsia,  and
indirectly the American mass culture audience on issues of importance to
the community.
45
45.  Some important discussions  of the role of intellectuals  in situations of domination are P.
FREIRE, PEDAGOGY  OF THE OPPRESSED  (M. Ramos  trans.  1970); F.  FANON,  THE WRETCHED OF
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The above  definition of cultural subordination  is patently ideologi-
cal.  The conceptual  scheme proposed  is only  one of many available to
describe and judge the status of an intelligentsia,  and within each scheme
there is a well developed critique of its rivals.
B.  Wat Might Be Gained Through Large-Scale  Affirmative Action
Against  this background,  I would  deny the existence  of a "black
point of view"  or a "black voice" in any essentialist (or racialist) sense.46
But that doesn't answer the particular questions that are relevant  to the
political and  cultural arguments for large  scale affirmative  action.  The
first of these is whether minority communities would get,  from a much
larger minority legal intelligentsia,  a scholarly output that would better
serve their diverse political, social and economic interests than what they
get  from an  overwhelmingly  white  legal intelligentsia.  The  second  is
whether  the legal  academic  community  as  a whole  would  get a  more
valuable total corpus of scholarship.
I see two likely changes in this regard.  A much larger minority  in-
telligentsia should produce more scholarship about the legal issues that
have impact on minority communities.  The subject matter of scholarship
is  determined  at  present  by  the  unregulated  "interest"  of academics.
What we  decide  to write  about just  "flows  naturally"  from  our back-
grounds, education and individual peculiarities.  I think it is obvious that
some significant proportion of minority intellectuals  would be led in this
way to  write about minority legal issues47
The precedent for this is the creation  of modem civil rights law by
black lawyers who devised the litigation strategy of the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People.  It would be farfetched  to
argue that the race of these lawyers was irrelevant to their choice of sub-
ject matter, or that the black civil rights cause would have evolved in the
same way had all the lawyers  involved been white.48
Along with more  scholarship  on minority issues,  there should  be
more scholarship on the implications for minorities of any issue currently
under debate.  In other words, Hispanic scholars working on the purest
THE EARTH (C. Farrington trans.  1968); E. FRAZIER,  BLAcK  BOURGEOISIE (1957); H. CRUSE, THE
CRISIS  OF THE NEGRO  INTELLECTUAL (1967).
46.  Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.  L. REv.  581  (1990).
47.  For an example  of the kind of work I am talking about see Harold McDougall's  articles
about the Mt. Laurel  decision.  McDougall,  The Judicial  Struggle  Against Exclusionary Zoning: The
New Jersey Paradigm,  14 HARv.  C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 625  (1979); McDougall, Mt. Laurel II and the
Revitalizing City,  15  RUTGERS L.J. 667 (1984);  McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in Exclu-
sionary Zoning Law, 22 HARv.  C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 623  (1987).
48.  See M. TUSHNET,  THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION,
1925-50 (1987).
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of corporate law questions within the most unquestionably Anglo schol-
arly paradigm are still, I think, more likely than white scholars to devote,
over the long run, some time to thinking about the implications of law in
their chosen technical area for the Hispanic  communities.49
The  second anticipated  change  is crucial  to my  argument.  Along
with a quantitative change in the focus of scholarship, it seems likely that
an increase in minority scholarship would change the framework of ideo-
logical conflict within which issues in the race area but also in other areas
are discussed.  I do not mean by this that there is a black (or other mi-
nority) ideology.  The point is rather that there are historic,  already es-
tablished  debates within the minority intelligentsias  that are  obviously
relevant to law, but that have been largely absent from legal scholarship.
Here are some examples of debates in the black intellectual commu-
nity that have only begun to get played out and transformed  in law:  be-
tween  nationalists  and  integrationists, 5 0  between  progressives  and
conservatives,51  between those who see current racism as a more or less
important determinant of current black social conditions,5 2 and between
black feminists and traditionalists.5 3  The nationalist versus integrationist
49.  An example of the kind of work I am talking about is Baeza, Telecommunications  Reregula-
tion and  Deregulation: The Impact on Opportunities  for  Minorities, HARV.  BLACKLETTER J., Spring
1985, at 7.
50.  I am referring here to the century and a half long discussion about the character of African
American identity and its implications for strategy.  The debate involves famous pairs, among them
Martin Delany, see THE CONDITION,  ELEVATION,  EMIGRATION,  AND  DESTINY  OF THE COLORED
PEOPLE OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  (1852),  and  Frederick  Douglass,  see  MY  BONDAGE  AND  MY
FREEDOM  (1855); Booker T. Washington, see THE FUTURE  OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO  (1899),  and
W.E.B. Du Bois, see THE SOULS  OF BLACK FOLK (1903); Marcus Garvey, see E. CRONON,  BLACK
MOSES:  THE STORY OF MARCUS  GARVEY  AND THE UNIVERSAL  NEGRO IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIA-
TION (1957),  and the later W.E.B. Du Bois,  see DUSK  OF DAWN:  AN ESSAY TOWARD  AN  AUTOBI-
OGRAPHY  OF A RACE  CONCEPT (1940);  E. Franklin Frazier, see BLACK BOURGEOISIE  (1957),  and
Harold Cruse, see THE CRISIS OF THE  NEGRO INTELLECTUAL (1967);  Malcolm X, see THE AUTO-
BIOGRAPHY  OF MALCOLM  X (1965),  and  Martin  Luther King, Jr., see  A TESTAMENT  OF  HOPE:
THE ESSENTIAL  WRITINGS  OF MARTIN LUTHER  KING,  JR. (.  Washington ed.  1986).  This list is
just an appetizer.  The primary and secondary  literatures are enormous.  A valuable summary and
reinterpretation  is  C. WEST,  The Four Traditions of Respons  in PROPHESY  DELIVERANCE!:  AN
AFRO-AMERICAN  REVOLUTIONARY  CHRISTIANITY  69 (1982).  See also R.  ALLEN, BLACK  AWAK-
ENING  IN  CAPITALIST  AMERICA:  AN  ANALYTIC  HISTORY (1969).  For an extensive  collection  of
sources,  see Peller, supra note  1.
51.  See T.  SOWELL,  MARKETS AND  MINORITIES  (1981)  and T.  SOWELL, RACE AND  ECONOM-
ICS  (1975).  For a progressive critique of Sowell,  see  Crenshaw, Race, Reform  and Retrenchment,
101  HARV.  L. REV.  1331,  1339-46  (1988).
52.  See W. WILSON,  THE TRULY  DISADVANTAGED:  THE  INNER  CITY,  THE  UNDERCLASS,
AND  PUBLIC POLICY (1987);  W. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE  OF RACE?:  A DIALOGUE
AMONG  BLACK  AND  WHITE  SOCIAL  SCIENTISTS  (1978);  See R.  Kennedy, supra note  3,  at 1814
n.296.
53.  For a classic statement of the conflict, see Z. N. HURSTON,  THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING
GOD  (1937).  See generally P. GIDDINGS,  WHEN  AND WHERE  I ENTER:  THE IMPACT OF  BLACK
WOMEN ON  RACE AND  SEX IN AMERICA  (1984);  B. HOOKS,  AIN'T I A  WOMAN:  BLACK WOMENDUKE LAW JOURNAL
and gender debates  are now for the first time beginning to get a hearing
as  a result of the presence  of more minorities  in the  legal  academy.5 4
There are similar  debates in the other minority communities. 55
C.  The Cultural  Case in the Context of Cultural  Subordination
It comes down to a question of value.  I have come (belatedly) to the
view that American culture and politics are rendered radically more in-
telligible  when  viewed through the lens that intellectuals  of color have
constructed over the years.  There is more in this general literature than
any one person can assimilate.  But there is nowhere near as much legal
scholarship as there ought to be.  Scholars with ties to subordinated com-
munities  are uniquely situated in respect to these ideological  resources,
and more likely  than white  scholars to mobilize them  to contribute to
our understanding  of law-in-society.
They are uniquely situated because, "even taking into account class,
gender,  and other divisions,"  there does indeed  remain "an  irreducible
link of commonality in the experience  of people of color:  rich or poor,
male or female, learned or ignorant, all people of color are to some de-
gree 'outsiders' in a society that is intensely color-conscious and in which
the hegemony of whites is overwhelming."'56  The ideological literature of
subordinated  communities  comes out of this experience,  in all  its vari-
ants,  and isaddressed  to it.  The flowering  in  legal  scholarship of this
literature combined with these experiences is just not something we can
plausibly expect from white scholars.
Again, the resources  are not Truths  to which only people of color
have  access (though, who knows,  there may be some of them), but de-
AND FEMINIsM (1981); see also L. RAINWATER  & W. YANCEY, THE  MOYNIHAN REPORT AND  THE
POLITICS  OF CONTROVERSY  (1967);  H.  CHEATHAM  & J.  STEWART,  BLACK FAMILIES:  INTERDIS-
CipLINARY  PERSPECTIVES  (1990).
54.  Derrick Bell's point of view has always contained elements of nationalism-particularly  his
writing on school desegregation.  Bell, Serving Two Masterm  Integration  Ideals and Client Interests
in School Desegregation  Litigation, 85  YALE L.J. 470 (1976)  (educational  improvement for blacks
must take precedence  over failed integration policies);  Bell, The Burden of Brown on Blacks:  His.
tory-Based Observations  on  a Landmark Decision,  7  N.C.  CENT.  L.L 25,  26  (1975)  (recognizing
Brown's limitations  and  arguing that it  should be  used as "critical  leverage  for a wide  range  of
[continuing] efforts"  by black communities to improve education for blacks).  The debate is internal
to Bell's book AND  WE ARE  NOT SAVED, supra note 4. With the publication of the articles cited in
supra notes 4 and 5, and the response in R. Kennedy, supra note 3, the issue seems finally to have its
own momentum within legal scholarship.  On black feminism in law, see Crenshaw, Demarginalizing
the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist  Critique  ofAntidiscrimination  Doctrine,  Feminist
Theory and  Antiracist  Politics;  1989 U.  CI. LEGAL FORUM  139; Harris, supra note 46.
55.  For example, compare R. RODRIGUEZ, HUNGER  OF  MEMORY:  THE EDUCATION  OF RICH-
ARD  RODRIGUEZ  (1982)  with A. MnRAND,  GRINGO JUSTICE  (1987).
56.  R. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1784.  Kennedy's article says only that there "might" be a link
of commonality  among people of color.  a
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bates  involving  all  the  complexity  of  incompatible  conceptual
frameworks and flatly contradictory  conclusions.  They relate the inter-
nal dialectics of subordinated communities, and the dialectic of their in-
teraction with  the United  States  at  large.  They  are  open  to multiple
interpretations, including specifically white interpretations.  For this rea-
son, a substantial increase in the number of minority scholars should also
improve white scholarship.
An increase in scholarship that takes seriously the issues that have
been raised by the black intelligentsia would have  relevance  to the de-
bates in legal scholarship about gender, sexual orientation and class.  In-
deed, I find it hard to think about, say, the separatist or culturalist strand
in modem feminism without relating it to the debate about racial identity
with which it is intertwined.  The historical influence of black liberation
thought on all other forms of late 20th century  American theory about
subordinated groups has been enormous.  But the influence has been in-
direct in legal thought, in part because of the small size of minority legal
intelligentsias.  Wherever  groups are  in question, whether  in corporate
law or in family law, or in the law of federalism or local government law,
the historic minority  debates and their contemporary  extensions  should
have an impact  on sophisticated mainstream thinking.
The issue is not whether there should be a cultural bias in judging
actual work.  When we have the work before us, there is no reason not to
consult  it  and  decide  for  ourselves,  individually,  who  has  produced
knowledge of value to us.  In judging value to us, the cultural status  of
the producer is irrelevant, and so is the "merit"  of the producer.  In and
of themselves  they neither add nor subtract value, though knowing the
author's status and accomplishment  can change our understanding of a
work  and  allow  us  to find  value  in it that  we  would  otherwise have
missed.  This knowledge can also mislead us.  There is no way to elimi-
nate this risk, since as I will argue in the next Section, we can understand
and assess the work only as a text situated in some presupposed cultural
and  ideological context, and assess it only from our own particular cul-
tural and ideological situation.
There is nothing thatprecludes  white scholars from making the con-
tributions  anticipated  from scholars  of color.  An  outsider  may  learn
about a culture and its debates and produce work about or even "within"
them that is "better"  than anything an insider has produced.  There are
advantages as well as disadvantages to outsider status, and everyone in a
multi-cultural society is simultaneously inside and outside.  And there is
nothing to guarantee that minority scholars will choose to or be able to
make those contributions.  They may squander their resources, or decide
to do work that is indistinguishable  in subject matter and approach from
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that of white scholars.  But their track record, with and without affirma-
tive action, has been  good enough,  easily, even  as tokens,  to sustain a
prediction of excellence to come.
D.  The Political  Case in the Context of Cultural  Subordination
Through  scholarship  focusing  on their own  concerns  and through
ideological  debate played  out in the legal  arena, minority  communities
(through their  intelligentsias)  develop  themselves  internally,  assimilate
for their own purposes  the resources  of the culture at large,  and build
power for the competitive struggle with other groups.  The power to cre-
ate this  kind of  knowledge  is political  power.  Therefore  it should  be
shared by all groups within the community affected.
This argument has two levels.  First, both the choice and the appli-
cation of academic standards have strikingly contingent cultural and ide-
ological  dimensions.  Law  faculties  distribute  political resources  (jobs)
through  a process  that is political  in  fact, if not in name.  One group
(white males of the dominant culture) largely monopolizes this distribu-
tion process,  and, perhaps not so surprisingly, also largely monopolizes
the benefits (jobs).  This outcome is politically illegitimate.  Second, sup-
posing that you disagree with what I have just said, and believe that stan-
dards are and should be apolitical, that position is itself ideological.  Law
faculties shouldn't make the ideological  choice between colorblind mer-
itocracy and some  form of race-conscious  powersharing  without a  sub-
stantial participation of minorities in making the decision.
1.  Cultural and Ideological Dimensions of Academic Standards.
There are different questions  we ask when  assessing  an academic  work.
There is the question of truth or falsity, understood to be a question sus-
ceptible of answers that when argued out will produce a broad consensus.
Then there are questions  of "originality"  and questions of "interest"  or
"value."
My  experience  has  been  that  work  in  law  (like,  I  assume,  some
work in physics) is sometimes wrong or untrue in a quite strong sense.  I
am convinced that when the error is pointed out just about everyone will
agree that it was an error.  I don't think the kinds of cultural differences
that  can  plausibly  be  asserted  to  characterize  American  society  have
much impact on these judgments.  This is sometimes true as well of ques-
tions of originality, interest and value.
Judgments of originality are obviously  more contested.  And judg-
ments of whether the problem addressed was "interesting"  or "valuable"
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seem to me very  strongly influenced  by the politics of academic  life.
57
Different  people in  a field  often have  very  different ideas  about which
true, original work is interesting.  Though the judges have a strong sense
that they know what they mean by interest, and that they are not making
"merely"  subjective judgments,  they also  concede  that the standard  is
difficult to apply.
More important for our purposes, they will generally concede that
interest or value can be judged only by reference to a particular research
tradition  or  scholarly  paradigm,  usually  one  among  many that  might
have won dominance in the field.58  Yet conclusions at the level of what
is valuable or interesting are very often dispositive in deciding which  of
two articles  is better.
Once  we acknowledge  the possible  existence  of different  research
traditions, or collective  scholarly projects, we have to acknowledge that
the white male occupants of faculty positions have more than the power
to decide which performances are better.  They have also had the power
to create  the traditions  or projects  within  which they  will make  these
judgments.  It seems obvious that these traditions or projects are cultur-
ally and ideologically specific  products.
The projects themselves, as well as the judgments of originality, in-
terest and value  they  ground  (not the narrow judgments  of truth and
falsity) would almost certainly  change if people of excluded cultures and
excluded  ideologies  were allocated power and opportunity  to create  re-
search traditions and scholarly projects of their own, or to participate in
those ongoing.  If this were done, there would be a gradual re-evaluation
of existing  legal  scholarship.  Some  currently  low-ranked  work  would
gain  esteem,  and  some  high-ranked  work would  lose it.  There  are no
meta-criteria  of merit that determine which among culturally  and ideo-
logically specific research traditions or scholarly paradigms is "better" or
"truer."  Judgments of merit are inevitably culturally  and ideologically
contingent because they are inevitably paradigm-dependent.
57.  The dividing line between questions that seem  "objective"  and those that seem "political"
or "subjective"  or "cultural"  or "ideological"  cannot be fixed  "objectively."  Although, we experi-
ence merely cognitive questions (Did the article cite and discuss the leading treatise on its subject?)
as very different from "value"  questions (Did the article discuss the leading treatise fairly?), we also
argue  about which domain we  are operating in.  I might claim the article did discuss the treatise,
although  it disposed  of its (silly) argument in a single sentence.  You  might respond that a single,
dismissive sentence just does not count as discussion.  I might counter that your view that there was
no discussion is a disguised judgment on the merits of the discussion.  And so forth.  For an analo-
gous  argument about adjudication,  see D. Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A
Critical  Phenomenology, 36 J.  LEGAL  EDUC.  518  (1986).
58.  See generally T. KuHN, THE  STRucTuRE  OF SCiENTiFiC  REVOLUTIONS  (2d ed.  1970).
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The choice of standards of originality, interest and value in judging
academic  work  has  profound  consequences  for  what  a  society  knows
about itself and its values.  And for who the members of society  are  in
consequence of their existence within  the particular known universe that
the knowledge-licensers  have  promoted.  Who  they  are  in  turn  reacts
back through their powers and weaknesses  onto the knowledge-licensing
process that has  created its own author.59
At a much more mundane level, the choice of standards controls the
choice of personnel in the enterprise of knowledge production,  which in
turn affects the relative power of the cultural communities that compete
in  civil  society.  Excluded  communities  compete  in the legislative  pro-
cess,  for example,  on the basis  of social  science  data assembled  in  re-
search  projects  whose  funding  and  direction  is  under  control  of  the
dominant  community.  They compete for favorable  rulings from  courts
on the basis of economic theories about the relative importance of distri-
butional  equity  and  efficiency  that are  unmistakably  tied  to the  white
conservative and white moderate research agendas of law and economics
scholars.
The fundamentalist has to deal with the claim that choices to allo-
cate scholarly opportunity are grounded in power, rather than merit, and
function to reproduce  the very  distribution of power they reflect.  The
power  is that of white, mainly  male  academics,  mainly  of "moderate"
ideology, to impose their standards.  They hold, and have held for many
generations, the positions to which society has allocated authority to dis-
tribute  this  kind  of  opportunity.  And  they  have  distributed  it  to
themselves.
As with the cultural case, there is nothing to guarantee that a larger
minority  legal  intelligentsia  would  use the resources  of law  schools  in
ways  that I would  find politically  constructive.  More jobs  might just
widen the gap between scholars of color and their communities,  and the
hiring process  might select  those  least likely,  for class  and  ideological
reasons, to pursue the project of empowerment.  If that happened,  those
for whom empowerment  is  the goal would  have to think of something
else.
2.  Who Gets to Decide Whether or not to Share Power?  The deci-
sionmaking  process  is  decentralized,  and  largely  depoliticized,  in  the
sense  of  "not  understood"  as  political.  The  main  decisionmakers  are
faculty members  of law  schools.  My  (ideological)  position  is  that the
depoliticization is bad, the decentralization  good.  If politicization would
59.  See generally 1 M. FOUCAULT,  THE HISToRY  oF SEXUALITY  (R. Hurley  trans.  1978).
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lead to centralization within the state sector, then these positions conflict.
But assume for the moment that they are not in conflict-that faculties
so inclined could go a long way toward power sharing with subordinated
cultural communities  (and social classes) without losing their autonomy
through  conflict  with other  political  institutions  (such  as  state legisla-
tures) committed to colorblind fundamentalism.
Faculties decide personnel questions by voting, usually on the basis
of one-tenured-person-one-vote.  In the process, individual faculty mem-
bers decide between colorblind fundamentalism and the vague available
alternatives.  Much more important, given the  political weakness of ad-
vocates of alternatives, they decide how to interpret fundamentalism  in
the face of its internal gaps,  conflicts and ambiguities.
These choices are incomprehensible unless put in the context of con-
flicting ideologies about the past and present of race in the United States.
The question  is  whether  law  faculties  as  presently  constituted  are  the
proper  people  to  make  these  ideological  decisions.  Our  selection
processes, combined with our historic selection practice, fail to guarantee
adequately that the whole community will be represented in these deci-
sions.  That is, they are democratically  inadequate.  Some measure of de-
mocracy  is  required  where  decisions  will  affect  the very  being  of the
community.
At this point the argument does a kind of backflip.  Suppose that the
fundamentalist responds to the claim of inclusion based on the political
nature of knowledge production that the premise is wrong.  Knowledge
is true or false, not left or right.  The goal is to produce as much of it as
possible,  without regard to the politics  of the producers.  This goal  is
inherently  apolitical or supra-political.
The second level argument is that the question of whether these de-
cisions are necessarily ideological is itself ideological.  Even if you think
knowledge production can be, is and ought to be non-political, you  still
have to decide  whether that  view is  one  you  should  be authorized  to
implement institutionally without having to argue and contend with peo-
ple who disagree.
Colorblind  meritocratic fundamentalism  is itself an ideology.  The
very  concepts of race,  culture, merit and knowledge  are intensely con-
tested both  within  and between  groups.6°  As the tone, the passion, of
60.  Let me illustrate this as follows.  A person from a group that has successfully used the idea
of merit to wrest from a dominant group  advantages previously denied on the basis of race might
well have a different view of how much is lost in the use of cultural criteria from a person who was
born into the dominant group.  But the differences  could  cut many ways  in generating  positions.
The person from the previously excluded group might conclude that merit is the only way to over-
come prejudice, and that adherence will lead eventually to a society in which skin color is irrelevant.
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Kennedy's article shows  on every page, it is a matter of commitment,  a
choice, to be a fundamentalist.  He rightly presents it as a fighting faith.
The question whether knowledge production is political is itself political.
Is the community's process for resolving the contest, its political process,
in short, a good  one?
The current procedure is inadequate because it involves neither the
normal democratic procedure of majority vote nor any of the more com-
plex procedures that often seem adequate to guarantee representation  of
all interests.  Recognition  of the political character of the decisions being
made  need mean neither  merger into  the central  state apparatuses  nor
local "home rule" through elections.  But it does mean that the licensers
have to do something to bring about accountability  for their choices  be-
tween and  within the competing  ideologies.  That something  should be
affirmative  action  sufficiently  extensive  so that minorities  have  enough
representation on faculties to be players in the decision about whether to
adopt race-conscious  decisionmaking.61
IV.  Do RACE-BASED  CRITERIA OF  SCHOLARLY  JUDGMENT
"DEROGATE  INDIVIDUALITY"?
This Section turns to Randall Kennedy's  claim that race-conscious
decisionmaking "derogates from individuality."  This argument is typical
of fundamentalist thinking as  it might  apply to a culturally and  politi-
But a person from the same group might believe that as long as merit is the only basis on which to
claim  advances,  advances  will be at the expense of cultural identity and  will  lead  to assimilation,
which is cultural suicide.  A person born into the dominant group might believe  that the only basis
on which advances are justified is merit, and that the dominant group is itself organized according to
merit.  Departures  from race neutrality  that favor the previously  excluded  may be necessary, but
they have a heavy cost of unfairness to meritorious members of the dominant group.  By contrast,
some  ruling class people  believe  that the internal  meritocratic  culture of the dominant  group has
large elements of sham.  Also that it has serious anti-social  consequences, and that departures from
its forms are likely to be beneficial  even if it turns out, unhappily, that they do not lead  to serious
cultural pluralism.
61.  One defense of the system would be that there is basic social consensus on the way faculties
do  their job, so  that self-consciously  culturally pluralist  procedures  are unnecessary.  This  would
deny that colorblind  fundamentalism is significantly contested,  either by alternative visions  or with
respect to the resolution of its internal gaps, conflicts and ambiguities when we have to decide what it
means in particular  cases. Contra Peller, supra note 1 and articles cited in supra notes 4 & 5. An-
other (somewhat inconsistent) defense would be that the process of colorblind meritocratic selection,
along with ideological  divisions among white males, has already produced a representation of minor-
ities  and enough  dissidents so that debate occurs  or soon  will  occur within  faculties.  The  formal
adoption  of power sharing is therefore not  needed. Contra Chused, The Hiring and Retention of
Minorities  and Women on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV.  537 (1988).CULTURAL  PLURALISM
cally based  affirmative  action  program.  (As noted  above,  Kennedy  is
sympathetic to affirmative  action, though on other grounds.)62
Kennedy's article makes the familiar argument that racial  categori-
zation is  dangerous per se, because it can be and and is used for racist
purposes.63  I recognize that this is a danger, but I think its degree has to
be assessed case by case.  In most situations, it is easy to distinguish be-
tween racist and anti-racist use of racial categories.  Facially neutral cate-
gories can  accomplish  almost anything a confirmed  racist  would want.
Whether we do better on balance by using race explicitly in institutional
decisionmaking,  or  by finding  other ways  to achieve  racial  objectives,
isn't a question to which we will ever find a decisive empirical answer.  I
advocate pervasive use of race-conscious decisionmaking because I don't
think we can deal with the problem of subordination without confronting
it directly,  and I don't think we can fully achieve the value of cultural
pluralism without self-consciously designing our institutions with that in
mind.
I don't think Kennedy's contrary position is just a matter of a differ-
ent empirical-intuitive assessment of the probabilities of "misuse'  or "so-
cially  destructive"  application. 4  Rather,  it  is  tied  to  the  general
fundamentalist conception  of prejudice and discrimination as subspecies
of the evil  of stereotyping.  And the intense fundamentalist  preoccupa-
tion with stereotyping  is, in turn, closely tied to what strikes  me as the
fetishizing  of "individual merit."  In Kennedy's  article, there are a few
paragraphs  about the bad consequences  of racial classification, 65 but the
theme that pervades  the whole article is that:  "[R]acial  generalizations,
whether  positive or negative, derogate from the individuality of persons
insofar as their unique characteristics are submerged in the image of the
group to which  they are deemed  to belong."66
62.  See supra text accompanying  notes  16-19.  See also 1_  Kennedy, Persuasion  and Distrust,
supra note 21,  at 1328-29  (affirmative action  "on balance...  is useful  in overcoming  entrenched
racial hierarchy").
63.  For example, Kennedy argues that:
The use of race as a proxy is specially  disfavored because,  even when relatively accurate
as a signifier of the trait sought to be identified, racial proxies are especially prone to mis-
use.  By the practice of subjecting governmentally-imposed  racial distinctions to strict scru-
tiny, federal constitutional law recognizes  that racial  distinctions are particularly  liable to
be used in a socially destructive fashion.
R. Kennedy, supra note 3,  at 1794.
64.  Id.
65.  These include his remarks on the use of the racial distinctiveness thesis by the Nazis, among
others.  See id  at  1789 n.197.  He also discusses the possibility that using race as an "intellectual
credential"  will backfire and harm minorities.  See id  at 1796.
66.  Id  at 1816.  To  derogate means "to  cause to seem inferior"  or "disparage"  or "detract"
from.  WEBsTER'S  NINTH  NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY  342  (1984).
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"Derogation from individuality"  occurs whenever there is  a failure
to distinguish between the "will"  of the individual and his or her merely
"social,"  "accidental,"  "ascribed"  or "inherited"  characteristics.  And it
occurs equally whenever we fail to distinguish the act of "will"  from the
materials,  likewise merely given, on which the individual works:
Neither one's racial status nor the experience one suffers as a result of
that status is capable of translating itself into art, a point applicable as
well to scholarship,  the "art"  of academicians.  An experience  is sim-
ply  inert-something  that happened.  That something  only becomes
knowable in a public way  through an act of will:  interpretation.67
Kennedy's  article  is a brief against  allowing  "race-conscious  deci-
sionmaking to be assimilated  into our conception  of meritocracy" 6 8  be-
cause  to do  so would be unfair  to "the  individual,"  whether  white  or
black, who  is  denied  recognition  of his or her  "merit"  in  the sense  of
"accomplishment"  (attainment, achievement).69
67.  R.  Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1804 (citing R. ELLISON,  SHADOW  AND  AcT  146 (1972)).
68.  Id.  at 1807.
69.  The following  quotations show,  I think, that Randall  Kennedy's  article is very  strongly
preoccupied  with the "derogation  of individuality,"  "act of will,"  "ascribed  versus achieved,"  and
"given  materials versus  willed addition"  issues:
[E]ven  if the scholarship at issue was narrowly concerned  with the inner-experience of a
single racial group, it would still be improper to presume expertise merely on the basis of a
scholar's membership in a given group.  One's racial (gender, religious, regional) identity is
no  substitute for the disciplined  study essential  to achieving  expertise.  Although one is
born with certain physical  characteristics to which society  attaches various labels, one is
not  born  with  knowledge  we  expect  of experts;  that characteristic  is  attained and  not
merely inherited.
Iad at 1777.
My central objection to the claim of racial distinctiveness  [is]  ...  that it stereotypes schol-
ars.  By stereotyping, I mean the process whereby the particularity of an individual's char-
acteristics are denied by reference to the perceived  characteristics of the racial  group with
which the individual is associated....  But...  "any stereotype results in a partial blindness
to the actual qualities of individuals, and consequently is a persistent and prolific breeding
ground for irrational treatment of them."
Id  at 1786-87 (quoting Lusky, The Stereotype: Hard  Core of  Racism,  13 BUFFALO  L. REv. 450, 451
(1964))  (footnote omitted).  "There  are many  types of classification that negate  individual identity,
achievement, and dignity.  But racial classification has come to be viewed as paradigmatically  offen-
sive to individuality."  Ia  at 1794.
Rather, the point is that distance or nearness  to a given  subject-"outsiderness"  or  "in-
siderness"--are simply social conditions;  they provide opportunities that intellectuals are
free to use or squander, but they  do not in themselves  determine the intellectual quality of
scholarly  productions-that  depends on  what a particular  scholar  makes of his or her
materials, regardless of his or her social position.
Ia  at 1795.  According to Kennedy, application of Delgado's idea of racial  standing
would be bad for all scholars because status-based criteria for intellectual standing are anti-
intellectual in that they subordinate  ideas and craft  to racial  status.  After all, to be  told
that one lacks "standing"  is to be told that no matter what one's message-no matter how
true or urgent or beautiful-it will be ignored or discounted because of who  one is.
Ia  at 1796.
[S]cholars should keep racial generalizations in their place, including those that are largely
accurate.  Scholars should do so by evaluating other scholars as individuals,  without pre-
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This argument depends on our ability to separate people from their
context:  "As  I define  the  term,  'merit'  stands for  achieved  honor  by
some  standard  that is  indifferent  to the  social  identity  of a given  au-
thor."'70  Judgments  that  are  colored  by  "social  identity"  are  "amer-
itocratic."  Social identity gets in the way when we allow our judgment to
be distorted by the skin color or ethnic experience of the person or work
in question, and also when  we allow personal relationships  to influence
US.
Kennedy's  initial list of ameritocratic  motives in  scholarly citation
includes:  "to display one's knowledge  of a given literature, to show def-
erence to those in a position to harm or help one's career, and to advance
toward all labels and categories that obscure appreciation of the unique features of specific
persons and their work.
Id. at 1796-97 (footnotes omitted).  For more, see id  at 1798 n.240.  In passing, the article emphati-
cally applies the same individualist idea to virtue and art, as well as merit:  "Participation  in strug-
gles against racial tyranny or any other sort of oppression is largely a matter of choice, an assertion
of will.  That  is  why we  honor those  who  participate  in such  struggles."  Id  at  1800.  Quoting
Ellison:  "[W]e select neither our parents, our race nor our nation ....  But we do become writers out
of an act of will, out of an act of choice."  Id.  at 1804 n.265.  Back to the theme:  Quoting Ellison:
"What  moves a writer...  is less meaningful than what  he makes of it."  Id at 1804.  "A badge of
merit should not be pinned onto someone simply because she exists in a state that she had no hand in
creating.  Merit should be limited to describing something that a person adds to their received condi-
tion."  Id.  at  1805  n.271.
The  strategy  of elevating  racial  status  to an  intellectual  credential  undermines  the
conception of intellectual merit as a mark of  achieved distinction by confusing the relation-
ship between  racial background  and scholarly expertise;  the former is a social condition in
which one is born, while the latter is something an individual attains.  Confusing accidental
attributes and achieved distinctions  in turn derogates the process by which all individuals,
simultaneously  limited and  aided by the conditions they inherit,  personally contribute to
human culture.
As I use the word, "merit"  is an honorific term that identifies a quality of accomplish-
ment that has been achieved;  it does not refer  to inherited  characteristics such as race or
gender.
Id.  at 1805-06.
"All he [Isiah  Thomas]  rightly argues  is... that observers  not  be so  overwhelmed  with his
God-given attributes that they fail to appreciate what he, on his own, adds  to them  .... "  d at 1806
n.272.
Part I of Kennedy's article discusses the "cultural  context" of the racial critiques.  There  is a
nod to the idea that this context requires an understanding of the "relationship  between  knowledge
and power," id  at  1749, but the overwhelming emphasis is on negative stereotyping of black intellec-
tuals by whites.  The notion of "derogation"  is central.  See id. at 1751  ("derogatory  comments") &
n.25  ("derogation  of Negro capacity").
(A]lthough the overt forms of racial  domination described thus  far were  enormously  de-
structive, covert color bars  have been, in a certain  sense, even more insidious.  After all,
judgments based on expressly racist criteria make no pretense about evaluating the merit of
the individual's work.  Far more cruel are racially prejudiced judgments that are rational-
ized in terms of meritocratic standards.  Recognizing that American  history is seeded with
examples  of intellectuals  of color  whose accomplishments  were  ignored  or undervalued
because of race is absolutely crucial  for understanding  the bone-deep resentment  and dis-
trust that finds expression  in the racial  critique literature.
Id. at 1752-53.
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the careers of friends or ideological  allies."71  He then adds racial favorit-
ism. 72  A  second list begins with "academic  nepotism by using citations
to promote friends."'73  Then, along with racial favoritism,  he denounces
"all practices that exploit the trappings of meritocracy to advance inter-
ests-friendship, the reputation  of  one's  school, career ambitions, ideo-
logical affiliations-that have  nothing  to  do  with  the  intellectual
characteristics of the subject being judged."'74
From the point of view of the political and cultural cases for affirma-
tive action, there are three problems with the "derogation  from individu-
ality" argument.  First, it repeatedly confuses the scholarly judgment of a
particular work with the judgment of a candidate for a job or promotion.
It is uncontroversial  that when we are  assessing a particular article, we
don't give it a higher quality ranking because it has a black author than
we would if it had a white author.  But Kennedy often seems to interpret
the "racial  critiques"  as  though  that were their position.  I don't  read
them that  way.  The  question  is  whether,  in  assessing  candidates,  we
should "presume"  that we will get a different and ultimately more valua-
ble total body of scholarly work if we allocate resources  in a race-con-
scious  way.75
71.  Id.  at  1772 (emphasis added).
72.  Id  at  1773.
73.  Id.  at 1806.
74.  Id. at 1807 (emphasis added).
75.  Kennedy  defines  "merit"  as  "achieved  honor by some standard  that is  indifferent to the
social identity of a given author."  Id.  at 1772 n. 114.  He seems to think that from this it follows that
race should not (cannot?) be an "intellectual  credential."
The  strategy  of elevating  racial  status  to an  intellectual  credential  undermines  the
conception of intellectual merit as a mark of achieved distinction by confusing the relation-
ship between  racial  background  and scholarly expertise;  the former  is a social condition
into which one is born, while the latter is something that an individual attains.  Confusing
accidental  attributes and achieved  distinctions in turn  derogates the process by which all
individuals,  simultaneously  limited  and  aided  by  the  conditions  they  inherit, personally
contribute to human culture.
Id.  at 1805-06.  But the confusion here is Kennedy's.  The word "credential"  was introduced into his
discussion  of affirmative  action  as  part  of the argument  that as  a matter  of probabilities  we  can
expect to get more of some desirable capacities  from minority rather than from majority scholars:
Arguing that race should be a consideration  in matching  instructors  to course offerings,
Harvard Law School Professor Christopher  Edley, Jr.,  maintained  that "[r]ace  remains a
useful  proxy for a whole collection of experiences,  aspirations  and sensitivities....  [W]e
teach what we have  lived .... " Similarly, Professor Derrick Bell argued that  '[ri]ace  can
create as legitimate  a presumption as a judicial  clerkship in filling a teaching  position in-
tended  to interpret ...  the impact of racial  discrimination  on the law and  lawyering."
Racial background can properly be considered a credential, he observed, because of "[t]he
special and quite valuable perspective on  law and life in  this country that a black person
can provide."
Id at  1758  (footnotes omitted).
Richard Delgado's Imperial  Scholar, supra note  4, likewise  speaks in  terms of probabilities  in
arguing that the minority community should not rely on white scholars to develop fields of law that
deeply affect their interests.  See R. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1788-89.  Delgado then argues that the
actual outcome of white scholarship is less favorable to minority interests than minority scholarshipCULTURAL PLURALISM
Second, the cultural and ideological aspects of my achievements (ac-
complishments, attainments) aren't separable, for purposes  of the judg-
ment of others, from the effects  of my "individuality"  or of my "will."
So there's nothing wrong, nothing "derogatory,"  in judging my work or
my promise in a way that is race-conscious  and sensitive to my ideologi-
cal commitments.  (Of course, the judgment may be incorrect, and it may
be prejudiced.)  Third, the judgment process, whose integrity Kennedy's
article wants  above all to preserve,  is always  already  corrupted  by the
ideological  and cultural factors he wants to exclude.  We avoid this only
if we  deliberately  impoverish  and trivialize judgment  by excluding  the
very aspects of individuals and their works that legal  academics  should
care most about.
A.  Culture,  Ideology and Individuality
1.  Culture.  The  category  of culture  fits  neither  the colorblind
meritocratic  view,  emphasizing  individual  freedom  to  succeed  or  fail
under universally  agreed standards,  nor the racialist  view that biology
has the power to determine people as meritorious or meritless.  Its signifi-
cance  for fundamentalism  is that membership  in a culture looks some-
what  like  a  status  attribute  of the  individual,  rather  than  something
"earned"  or  "achieved."  Culture  is  reproduced  through  child rearing
and through life in a habitually closed discursive system.  But people can
"change  cultures"  or  "assimilate"  to  a culture  other  than  their  own.
People are often "bicultural"  or even "tricultural."
As with class, there seem to be no inherent limits on what a person
can  achieve  in an  adopted  culture.  On  the other hand,  assimilation  is
hard work, a talent in itself, and we usually think of assimilation as very
different  from  being  "born  into"  a  culture.  There  are  always  doubts
about  "authenticity,"  or  the  possibility  that the  assimilated  person  is
"neither fish nor fowl."
Introducing the notion of culture blurs the distinction between judg-
ing on the basis of "mere"  status,  assumed to have no connection with
would be, but here he is doing just what Kennedy approves.  He is making substantive judgments of
actual works (although he may be wrong or may not have  proved his points).  See id.  There is no
confusion between  "accidental  attributes  and achieved distinctions."
In a footnote, Kennedy concedes that for some jobs under some  circumstances, race would be a
valid basis for favoring  one candidate over  another.  But instead of asking whether legal academic
jobs do or do not fall into this category, he instead argues that we should not use the word "merit" to
describe what makes the  candidate better for the job.  No one is arguing about how  to define  the
word "merit."  The issue is what should count as a "credential"  in a hiring situation, and Kennedy's
own text here recognizes, without refuting, the type of argument his opponents are making. See id
at 1805  n.271.
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capacities or other qualities of individuals,  and judging on "achievement
of the individual,"  assumed to be independent of status.  Culture is both
deeply ingrained (not changeable at will, even if changeable over the long
run) and  strongly  differentiating;  my  ability  to produce  artifacts  with
meaning is therefore tied to my status.
This  concept  of culture  makes  the  notion  of "inert"  experience
transformed  into  something  of value  by  the  "individual"  seem  pretty
crude.  The individual is "made"  by a whole body of experiences, shaped
into a particular cultural being.  When he or she sets out to produce an
artifact out of a particular experience, what gets made is a product of all
these other experiences that are collective, group, consciously and uncon-
sciously  cultural  experiences.  These  collective  things  influence  every-
thing from the way the particular "raw  material"  is experienced  to the
way it is  translated  into whatever artifactual  medium  the "individual"
chooses.
Culture is an attribute  of an individual that is "inherited"  (though
not biological),  both in the sense of "coming  from the past" and in the
sense of being, in any particular case, partially ineradicable through indi-
vidual will.  And that attribute  is one  that produces  a heavy collective
influence on  all the performances  and capacities of the individual.  The
fundamentalist  cannot level against cultural claims the assertion  of "ir-
relevance"  or "irrationality"  that is enough to dismiss  claims based  on
race per se.76
76.  This does not mean that only cultures produce  culture.  We  can still  identify authors  of
artifacts within  a culture and compare  them.  If the culture has only group  authors, then  we can
distinguish between  the groups.  The mere existence of  culture poses no a  priori  problems for making
judgments of value between  artifacts or between  their creators.
It is equally wrong to think that the fact of culture (if it is a fact) makes it impossible to judge
the merit of work or capacities of a person from another culture. We can assess the ability of anyone
to produce a given  type of artifact of our own culture.  We look at the work, not who produced it,
and we just treat it as an attempted  performance within our own culture and  ask if it succeeded.
Then we  make inferences about the likely capacity  of the individual  or group author to do more
work of the same quality.  We  can even rank cultures  according  to  their production of particular
kinds of valued artifacts and capacities.
Yet another mistake is to believe that one can't assess the value of people or work in another
culture according to its own, alien standards.  A person from one culture often has the experience of
knowing what is going on in another.  It is possible to pick up on the way the other culture assesses
work and people, and predict accurately what the consensus view of quality in a foreign culture will
be.  But it is also true that what we think we know about actions or performances in another culture
is suspect  in a way not  true of what  we think we  know in our own, because  we may  "misread"
behavior in the other culture.  Given the "inherited"  quality of cultural capacity, we never "read"  in
the unselfconscious  way we do in our own context.
Finally, it's wrong to think there cannot be shared values between cultures.  Each culture may
understand the other as using the same standards for assessing particular kinds of artifacts.  On the
other hand, a conviction that we are applying the same standards across cultures must be held more
tentatively  than  the same  view  within a  culture.  Because of "our"  difference  from  "them,"  theCULTURAL  PLURALISM
At the same time, there is the experience  of freedom within culture
(indeed,  where else could one  experience  it, since  there is no extra-cul-
tural space),  and the experience  of individual accomplishment.  A given
culture may be more or less committed to the "cultural fluidity, intellec-
tual  freedom,  and  individual  autonomy"77  Kennedy's  article  defends.
People self-consciously  make their own  selection from among the posi-
tions or attitudes  available  within a culture  (as part of the repertoire);
and they choose positions and attitudes toward the very culture that con-
stitutes their being.  A person's action can change the culture that defines
the possibilities of action.  Recognizing culture doesn't annihilate the in-
dividual.  But  recognizing  it does  blur the boundary  between  self and
social context and problematizes the assertion that a capacity or an arti-
fact can be divided up into one part that is the inert matter and another
part that is reflective  of "will,"  "accomplishment"  or "achievement."
2.  Ideology.  Once  you  choose  an  ideology,  you have  "rejected
one path in favor of another," and what you see and do as you travel that
path will be different from what you would have seen and done going the
other way.  Ideology  is  commitment.  It is the decision to work on this
line of inquiry rather than that one, to assume  away these issues rather
than those, in a situation where one cannot say that there was no other
course available.  You may be able to say that given your good faith be-
lief in the rightness  of your path,  you obviously  had no choice.  But if
other people believed equally  in good  faith that your path was wrong,
and theirs right, then your choice was ideological.  Once one has made,
explicitly or implicitly, choices of this kind, there are kinds of work one
doesn't  find  oneself  doing  and  kinds  of  problems  one  finds  oneself
ignoring.
appearance of sharing a standard may be illusory.  When  we discuss an evaluative or even a descrip-
tive issue with a person from another  culture on  the mutual assumption that we  share standards,
there is always the possibility that we will find ourselves at a stalemate that seems best explained by
admitting that the standards were not shared in the first place.
The  point in all these cases is that we can problematize the operation of making judgments of
value,  of applying standards,  without abandoning it  altogether.  See supra note  57.  See also R.
RORTY,  CONSEQUENCES  OF  PRAGMATISM  166-67 (1982):
"Relativism"  is the view that every belief on a certain topic, or perhaps about any topic, is
as good  as every  other.  No one holds  this view.  Except  for the occasional  cooperative
freshman, one cannot find anybody who says that two incompatible opinions on an impor-
tant topic are equally good.  The philosophers  who get called "relativists"  are those who
say that the grounds for choosing between such opinions are less algorithmic than had been
thought....  So the real issue is not between people who think one view [is]  as good as an
other and people who do not.  It is between those who think that our culture, or purpose,
or intuitions cannot be supported except  conversationally, and  people who  still hope for
other sorts of support.
77.  P.  Kennedy, supra note 3,  at 1805.
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My view is that it just isn't possible to do legal scholarship without
making choices of this kind, consciously or unconsciously.  [This view is
part of my ideology.]  Within legal scholarship, we are fighting out basic
questions about how society is organized.  More specifically,  we are fight-
ing about the lives of the ethnic minorities and majorities of the country.
The descriptive and prescriptive categories we use (e.g., balancing, rights,
efficiency, domination) are sharply contested among us, as are underlying
conceptions of American  social reality itself.78
One's ideology is more a matter of choice than one's cultural iden-
tity, but it poses similar difficulties for the fundamentalist understanding
of individual merit.  When you choose one among the possible ideologi-
cal paths,  you lose,  as  you  travel  along it, access  to the data and  the
perspective you might have had along another possible path.  Of course,
it is not as though the view from another ideological vantage point is just
unimaginable.  And it is always possible to go back and start again or to
set off through the underbrush.  But  whenever you  stop and  decide to
write something, you do it from a particular position on the ideological
map.  You  are  enlightened  but  also  limited,  "situated"  in  ideological
space much as you are situated in a community and in a cultural identity.
There is no no-position-position.
Further, ideologies  are collective  projects created  over time.  Indi-
viduals  discover  them, in  the sense  of coming upon  them,  but do not
invent them, any more than an individual can invent a culture.  Once you
discover an ideology, you explore it, grapple with its great figures or its
everyday  cliches,  assimilate  to it little by little  or undergo  conversion.
You adapt it to your purposes, and perhaps try to change it, even radi-
cally, but it has a trans-individual continuity.  Someone else will reinter-
pret your reinterpretation.
Finally, the "you"  who pursues pre-ideological  purposes is never in
a purely instrumental relation to the ideology that consciously or uncon-
sciously  provides  your  framework  and  conceptual  vocabulary.  The
frame remakes you through and through even as "you"p  "use"  "it."  Ken-
nedy's article treats ideological affiliation as just another bias, like friend-
ship or the desire  to advance one's career.79  But the "slant"  that each
person's ideological formation gives his or her work and his or her judg-
ments of other people's work is neither an idiosyncratic individual mat-
ter, irrelevant in the same way that hair or eye or skin color is irrelevant,
nor a distortion that we could purge if we tried hard  enough.
78.  See supra note 20.
79.  See supra text accompanying notes  71-74.
[Vol.  1990:705CULTURAL  PLURALISM
3.  Individuality.  Individuality,  against  this  background,  is  a
problematic  as well as  an indispensable  idea.  There are many possible
interpretations, but two seem to me to emerge tempered rather than con-
sumed by critical fire.  Both start from the notion that culture and ideol-
ogy provide a vocabulary  from which  "individuals"  pick and choose to
produce themselves, constrained by their situation in time and space but
with plenty available, even in the most apparently  "disadvantaged"  posi-
tion, from which to make something that has the stamp of unpredictable
humanity.
In the first interpretation, individuality is a pattern we read into be-
havior, from the most mundane to the most exalted, behavior that may
seem  at  first glance  nothing  more than  a jumble  of familiar  elements
culled from the stockpiles of culture, ideology and psychology.  Everyone
has a race, a sex,  a class,  a culture, ideological  presuppositions, even a
more or less immutable neurotic style.  But no one is only these things,
because  each  person's production  of self at any given  moment,  in any
given law review article, is a particular selection  and  combination from
an inexhaustible universe of possibilities.  "Individuality"  is an effect pro-
duced on, an experience of "readers,"  brought about by the juxtaposition
of elements in a way that is neither logically compelled nor arbitrary, but
recognizably  designed to say something to someone.
In this way of looking at it, my individuality is something you have
access to only through  my behavior, my tone of voice or my tome on
hardy perennials.  I exist,  even for myself, only embedded in materials,
some of my choosing, some not, materials produced by others for pur-
poses other than those I now  pursue.
In the second interpretation  of individuality,  we  try to get at the
producer of these shows, to sneak behind the stage and confront the Wiz-
ard of Oz.  But there is an infinite regress.  Who is the wizard producing
the modest humbug who produced the Wizard?  The condition of meet-
ing up with another "individual,"  in this second view,  is accepting that
he or she will just appear on your wave length, in moments of intersub-
jective zap.  There is no assurance that he or she will be there, in contact,
at the next moment, or that when he or she reappears it will be as "the
same person."  There is no way to fix  the other through understanding
(through an image of what he or she is really like, or a theory of his or
her personality, or whatever).  Both the other and the self are unitary in
the moment but multiple over time-intelligible in the moment but con-
tradictory  taken all together.  The individual, in this view, is what is not
embedded,  and  therefore  what  is  ineffable,  unjudgeable,  ungraspable
with the apparatus  of thought.
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I subscribe  to both  views  (they do not  seem  to me incompatible),
and so am happy to be called an "individualist."80  But neither view al-
lows the operation of meritocratic judgment of a person or a work, with-
out regard to  cultural and ideological  context,  that is  so important in
fundamentalism.
B.  "Individuality" Cannot Be Distinguished  from Culture and
Ideology
It is  not unfair to judge the individual,  in deciding  to hire or pro-
mote, on the basis of the social characteristic  of connection to a cultural
community, because the individual cannot be separated from his or her
culture  in  the way  that  Kennedy's  article requires.  The  "individual"
simply doesn't exist in that way.  It is quite reasonable,  and  I have no
cause to complain, if you expect different things of me, predict different
things of me, and make different interpretations and hence different eval-
uative judgments of what I say, because you know something of my cul-
tural context.
It doesn't derogate from my individuality that you "do this to me."
There just isn't work I do or a me you can evaluate, or about whom you
can make reasonable predictions,  that isn't embedded  in culture.  All I
can do in response is to reserve the  right to argue when I feel that the
stereotypes  you  apply  distort  your  perceptions  of my  meaning  or my
capacity.
Second,  I wouldn't want my legal scholarship to be evaluated  in a
colorblind way.  Because we do our scholarly work in a context of cultur-
ally specific meanings,  we are limited  as individuals in what we can do
and express,  even in what we can be understood to say.  But we are also
empowered to do things that are only intelligible because we do them in
the particular context.  Because I know that Randy Kennedy is a black
American intellectual writing in 1989, I get much more out of his article
than I could if I had to guess at who had written it and when and where.
In an earlier article, On Cussing out White Liberals,  81 Kennedy  de-
scribed a style of black protest and critiqued it.  Racial  Critiques of  Legal
Academia has much the same agenda.  I read both articles as written in
the cussing-out-black-militants  genre, in which a progressive integration-
ist black author takes black radicals  to task.  I suspect that I don't pick
up on all the subtleties, but because I have a notion that this genre exists,
80.  The  first  interpretation  is  influenced  by  C.  Livi-STRAuss,  THE  SAVAGE  MIND  1-33
(1966),  the second by J.-P. SARTRE,  BEING  AND  NOTHINGNESS  3-30 (H. Barnes trans.  1956),  and
both by Derrida,  The Law of Genre, in ON  NARPATIVE  (W. Mitchell  ed.  1981).
81.  NATION,  Sept. 4,  1982, at  169.
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the article has a whole level of coherence for me that it would not other-
wise have.
82
An important rhetorical move in cussing is to begin with denuncia-
tions  of white  racism  adequate  to refute  in  advance  the accusation  of
Tomism.  Then comes the central pitch:  the  militants are using unsub-
stantiated  accusations of white  racist discrimination and white  cultural
bias as lame excuses for their own and the minority community's failure
to live up to neutral standards of excellence.  All  the hot but in the end
contentless talk about racial identity is just posturing.
Writers in this genre typically charge  that black militant posturing
diverts attention from the real problems  of minority  performance,  and
lays a spurious claim to special treatment from white institutions, a claim
that white liberals are all too willing to accept.  That acceptance is conde-
scending, because the liberals won't openly apply  to what the militants
say  the  same  standards  of  sensible  discourse  that  they  apply  among
themselves or to their white adversaries.  This reflects both white liberal
wimpiness and an underlying white racist belief that sloppy militant rhet-
oric is the best that can be expected from black (and Hispanic and Asian)
folk.
Kennedy's article falls into the trickiest subspecies of this genre, the
one that is concerned with the "academic study of academia."  The basic
move in this sub-genre is to apply the standards the militants are criticiz-
ing to the militants'  own critique.  Neutral standards of scholarly  excel-
lence  show that the attack  on neutral standards of scholarly  excellence
lacks scholarly  excellence.  This type of argument can  cut to the quick
because of the history of racial stereotyping of minorities as intellectually
inferior, and because mainstream  post-1960s  political thought dismisses
radical minority  intellectuals as hysterical second raters or racists.
I don't think it derogatory to assess Kennedy's article as a perform-
ance in  this specific  genre.  The  article  is more interesting, and  also it
seems to me better in some ways and worse in others, when read as com-
ing from a racial  (cultural) and ideological  position.  The  "individual"
who wrote it is more accessible  when we understand the literary materi-
als he was working with.  The danger is that we will confuse the "voice"
of the genre with the actual author, whose individuality,  as I suggested
above, is ungraspable.  If we confused the person  with the genre in this
case, it would be difficult to understand how Randy Kennedy could have
written the following:
82.  A striking example of the genre is Kilson,  The Black Experience at Harvard,  N.Y. TiMES.,
Sept.  2,  1973,  § 6 (Magazine), at  13.  It is interesting to contrast the genre in which a more or less
conservative white author attacks the same black radical and white liberal characters, but in a quite
different tone.  See T. WOLFE,  RADICAL  CHIC AND  MAU-MAUING  THE FLAK  CATCHERS (1970).
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In the forties,'fifties and early sixties, against the backdrop of laws that
used racial  distinctions to  exclude Negroes  from opportunities  avail-
able to white citizens, it seemed that racial subjugation could be over-
come by  mandating the application of race-blind  law.  In retrospect,
however, it  appears  that the  concept of race-blindness  was simply  a
proxy  for the fundamental  demand that racial  subjugation  be  eradi-
cated.  This demand, which matured over time in the face of myriad
sorts of opposition,  focused upon the condition of racial subjugation;
its target was  not only procedures  that overtly  excluded  Negroes  on
the basis of race, but also the self-perpetuating dynamics of subordina-
tion that had survived the demise of American apartheid.  The oppo-
nents of affirmative action have stripped the historical context from the
demand  of race-blind  law.  They have  fashioned  this demand  into  a
new totem and insist on deference to it no matter what its effects upon
the very group the fourteenth  amendment was created  to protect.8 3
Because  you know that I am a white American intellectual writing
in the 1990s,  there are a million things I can say in this article without
saying them, because you will infer them from this cultural context.  And
there are a million things you will read in that I didn't mean to be there.
I see the interdependence,  the inseparability of my individuality and my
context as inevitable and also as something to be embraced.  Likewise my
simultaneous  limitation and empowerment  by the fact of working in a
'context.  My  individuality  is  not  "derogated"  when  I am judged  and
when I communicate in a context,  though there is bitter with the sweet.
The same is true of ideology.84
C.  Rational  Meritocratic  Judgment Cannot Be Culturally and
Ideologically Neutral
The flip side is that there is no evaluation aimed at getting at what I
value in my own work that won't be contingent on your cultural identity.
What I am trying to achieve in my work is a contribution to a cultural
situation in which  I am implicated,  culturally  specific.  This is  equally
true of the people  whose  judgment  I most value.  If I can't be judged
outside of my context, they can't judge me outside of their context.  This
means that no matter how favorable the judgment, I can't take it as "ob-
jective."  But it also means I can criticize critiques and reject their con-
demnation as  "distorted."  I don't have  to claim  or to abandon  either
universality or context-dependence. -I can switch back and forth between
the  two  perspectives,  though  without any  "meta-level"  assurance  that
I'm ever getting it right.  All of the above applies  to my ideological  as
well as to my cultural context.
83.  R. Kennedy, Persuasion  and Distrust,  supra note 21,  at  1335-36.
84.  Cf.  Frug, Argument as Character,  40 STAN.  L. Rnv. 869  (1988).
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There are a million misunderstandings,  based on racial, ideological,
national and temporal stereotypes, to which Randy Kennedy  and I are
subject because you read us in this context.  And because you know what
you know  of the context, there are good readings of our texts that you
may  discern against  our will.  There  is  nothing we can  do about this,
except argue  on our own behalf.
The argument may involve racism.  I see racism as more than "inac-
curate stereotyping."  It is "neurotic"  in the same sense that the fetishiz-
ing of merit is.  It is insisting on the stereotype's truth because you want
or need it to be true, in the face of evidence that the group or a particular
member  is  completely  different  from  what  you  expected.  The  racist,
whether white or black, won't let you be other than what he or she wants
you to be, and that is something bad.  But if you accept that you  have a
cultural identity, the attack on it can't be dismissed  as "just" irrational,
in the way it could  if all cultural  communities were the same, or if the
differences  between them made no difference.
It might be true that the racist  is making a correct negative judg-
ment about something that really is a part of you but that there is little or
nothing you can do about.  It might be true because cultural  communi-
ties are different and you have characteristics  that are derived from your
cultural  community.  The  hatred  you  encounter  is wrong or  crazy,  as
hatred.  But there might be, somewhere mixed in with it, a valid negative
judgment on your group identity.  If you don't think that's so, then even
after you have rejected and condemned the crazy hatred dimension,  you
have to defend the communal aspect  of your being on the "merits."
Against this background,  it seems  to me legitimate and  useful for
Richard Delgado  to attempt  an explicitly race-coqscious  assessment  of
the white  liberal  constitutional  law  scholarship  of the  1970s  and  80s.
"Scholars  should  ...  evaluat[e]  other scholars  as  individuals,  without
prejudgment, no matter what their hue,"' 8 5  as Kennedy's article suggests,
in the sense of avoiding stereotyping like the plague.  But Kennedy's arti-
cle urges  us (somewhat  ambiguously) to  "keep  racial  generalizations  in
their place, including those that are largely  accurate."'86
I  don't agree with this if it means that we can't try to  figure out
whether, for example,  a distaste for the "reparations"  argument for af-
firmative action is a characteristic trait of a particular white liberal mode
of con  law  analysis.  And I  see nothing  wrong  with trying to connect
such  a trait  to  the unconscious  motives  of white  liberal  scholars  as  a
culturally  and ideologically  distinct group, or with condemning  it as  a
85.  R. Kennedy, supra note  3, at 1796; see also id. at 1796-97.
86.  Id. at 1796.
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"defect."  It is not, for me, a question of the legitimacy of a type of analy-
sis, but of the plausibility of a particular interpretation.8 7
In short, it is legitimate for Delgado to argue for a "linkage of White
scholars'  racial  background  to the qualities in  their work that he per-
ceives  as  shortcomings, s 88  so  long as  he  makes his  case.8 9  Kennedy's
article poses  a false alternative:
[Tihe point is that distance or nearness to a given subject-  "outsider-
ness" or "insiderness"--are  simply social conditions; they provide op-
portunities that intellectuals  are free to use  or squander, but they do
not in themselves  determine the intellectual  quality of scholarly pro-
ductions-that depends on what a particular scholar makes of his or
her materials, regardless of his or her social position.90
Cultural and ideological situations are neither "simply social condi-
tions" (in the sense of "inert matter") nor attributes that "determine...
intellectual  quality."  They are betwixt and  between.  They are "forma-
tive"  rather than "inert"  or "determining."  And this is the premise  of
Kennedy's  own article, the first section of which is "The Cultural  Con-
text of Racial  Critiques."
In that section, the article argues that the racial critiques "share an
intellectual  kinship with several  well-known  and influential intellectual
traditions." 91  We learn that we can't "understand"  the racial critiques
except in the context of "the  ongoing effort by intellectuals  of color to
control the public image of minority groups." 92  In the sections entitled,
"The Racial  Exclusion Claim as a Form of Politics,"  and "The Politics
of Publicity,"  Kennedy's article assesses the arguments of Bell, Delgado
and Matsuda  as  the arguments of scholars of color.  Their  claims have
87.  Along the same lines, I see nothing wrong with trying to figure out the social psychology of
the preference  for efficiency  and "unequal  bargaining  power" arguments  over distributional  argu-
ments in "moderate" legal scholarship, see D. Kennedy, Distributive  and Paternalist  Motives in Con-
tract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal  Bargaining  Power, 41
Mi.  L. REv.  563  (1982),  or with attributing  the white  CLS hostility  to rights  rhetoric to some
combination  of neo-marxist ideology  and middle class white cultural  context. See Williams,  supra
note 5,  at 414.  As in the case referred to in the text, the question for me is not whether the type of
analysis is legitimate but whether the particular instance is convincing.
88.  R. Kennedy, supra note 3,  at 1793 (commenting on Delgado, Imperial  Scholar,  supra note
4, at 568-69).
89.  Since what  is involved is a cultural/ideological  analysis, there is no inconsistency, indeed
there is "merit" in noting that the traits are not shared by all whites and that the same traits appear
in the work of some scholars of color.  For a rejection of this position, see R. Kennedy, supra note 3,
at 1793.
90.  Id.  at 1795.
91.  Id at 1747.
92.  Id at 1754.  In the text and footnotes,  Kennedy repeatedly points out the racial composi-
tion of the groups trying to control this public image, referring  to the "Black Power Movement," id.
at 1755,  "black scholars,"  id. at 1756 nn.46 & 48, "black  writers,"  id.
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"an outer facet addressed  principally  to whites  and an  inner facet ad-
dressed  principally to minorities. '93
He then proceeds  to analyze the bad motives  (guilt tripping white
liberals  and cheerleading  for minorities)94 behind  their arguments  in a
way that seems indistinguishable from what Delgado did with the white
liberal constitutional law scholars.95  His attribution of motives is a com-
plex inference from their texts, but also from his knowledge that they are
scholars of color writing in the radical intellectual  tradition that he has
identified,  and pursuing a particular political (ideological) project.
Imagine that Kennedy's article shows up in the file of Professor Bell,
Matsuda or Delgado  when one of them is being considered  for a lateral
appointment.  The article would certainly be read as an assessment of the
"merit"  of their scholarship, but hardly as applying  a "standard that is
indifferent to the social identity of a given author."'96  Wouldn't it, using
Kennedy's  criterion,  "derogate  from  [their]  individuality...  insofar as
their unique characteristics  are submerged  in the image  of the group to
which they are deemed to belong"? 97  Indeed, one might argue that the
article  "stereotypes"  them as  "militants of color" in order to cuss them
out for the sins of the Black Panthers and the black sociology movement
of the  1960s.98
Of course, it is not unimaginable that any of the racial critique arti-
cles could have been written by a white.  In that case, it seems likely that
Kennedy's  article  would  have  levelled  many  of  the  same  criticisms
against the white author, but omitted some and added others.  Kennedy's
article asserts that "some  observers do not have much confidence  in the
abilities,  or perhaps  even  the  capacities,  of minority  intellectuals ...
[T]hey lack the sense that those with whom they disagree  are their intel-
lectual  equals." 99  If Bell,  Matsuda  or  Delgado  were  white,  Kennedy
might critique  the  "merit"  of their discussions  of minority  scholarship
through the observation that "[s]ometimes  observers  display their low-
ered  expectations  ...  by more generously  praising work by minorities
than they would praise  similar work by whites."1oo
93.  Id.  at 1807 (emphasis added).
94.  See id. at  1808.
95.  Kennedy writes, "Professor  Delgado rejects both 'conscious  malevolence or crass indiffer-
ence.'  Rather, he posits that the imperial scholars'  exclusionary conduct is mainly unconscious and
prompted  by their  desire  to maintain  control,  to prevent scholarly  criticism  from becoming  too
threatening to the academic  and political status  quo."  Id.  at  1771  (footnotes omitted).
96.  Id. at 1773 n.114.
97.  Id. at 1816.
98.  See id. at  1755 & n.44, 1790.
99.  Id. at  1818-19  (footnotes omitted).
100.  Id. at 1819  n.308.
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My  point is not to censure Kennedy's  article for "race-conscious"
assessment of merit.  It is rather that if one wants to take work like theirs
seriously, as he does, it just is not possible to make the rigid separation he
proposes between the authors' merely accidental or inherited aspects and
their "will"  or  "achievement"  as  "individuals."  Kennedy  is  wrong  to
claim that the cultural background  (race) and ideological  affiliations  of
an author "have nothing to do with the intellectual characteristics  of the
subject being judged."''1
Since it  is  legal scholarship  and  law teaching  that is in  question,
culture and ideology  (mediated  through intellectual  paradigms  and re-
search projects)  permeate the subject being judged.  It is about how our
culturally diverse and ideologically divided society should be organized.
We can achieve colorblind neutrality and ideological neutrality only if we
refuse to assess these aspects.  Kennedy's article proposes (his own prac-
tice to the contrary notwithstanding) to judge the work without consider-
ing its subject and purpose.  This is an evasion of politics. 1 0 2
D.  Taking Colorblindness  Seriously
We could avoid all this in assessing candidates  for jobs and tenure.
Many law faculties adopt in practice (though not in theory) a rule that if
you publish  some number of articles  on clearly  legal  topics in well  re-
garded law reviews,  you will get tenure.  Period.  No one will try to de-
cide whether they think the articles are any good.
A  judgment of this kind is not outside culture and ideology, because
what counts as  "legal,"  what law reviews  are  "well  regarded,"  and the
criteria by which those reviews judge articles submitted for publication,
are  all  culturally  and  ideologically  contingent.  But it is  perfectly  true
that when  the  faculty  accepts  the standard,  they  can apply  it without
animadversion  to culture or ideology.  They can grant tenure to anyone
who  meets  the  standard,  even  if all  the  articles  would  be  culturally
strange and ideologically  abhorrent to them if they read them.
Another  tack  is to  distinguish  "craft"  or  "technique"  from  sub-
stance, conceding the cultural and ideological  contingency  of the latter,
but  maintaining  neutral  standards  for  the former.  The  distinction  is
problematic,  because  different  cultures  and  ideologies  and  paradigms
101.  Id  at 1807.
102.  Kennedy remonstrates that he does not seek to evade  politics.  He quotes  Lionel Trilling
with approval:
[O]ur fate, for better or worse, is political.  It is therefore not a happy fate, even if it has an
heroic sound, but  there is no  escape from it, and the only possibility  of enduring  it is to
force into our definition of politics every human activity and every subtlety of human activ-
ity.  There are manifest dangers  in doing this, but greater dangers  in not doing it.
Id at 1787 n.191  (quoting L. TRILLING, THE  LIBERAL  IMAGINATION  96  (1950)).
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have  different conceptions  of craft.  It is problematic  because  different
paradigms may be at different levels of technical development  at a given
moment.  But the deeper objection is that judging a work that aspires to
substantive importance  on this basis is arbitrary if the judges are them-
selves interested in rewarding valuable substance (as well as in virtues of
execution).  It means we hire people who are substantively empty or evil
because  they are "competent."  It means we refuse  to hire people who
have  profound  insights  because  they lack  something valuable  but  less
important.
Yet another approach is to recognize that there are "genres"  of legal
scholarship, and to hire or promote "the best" within each.  The obvious
objections here are that "outsider" judgments about what is good within
a genre are likely to vary dramatically according to the ideological com-
mitments  and genre loyalties of the judger.  And once  one has ranked
works  within  various  genres,  there  is  the  question  of  allocating  the
"slots"  among them.  If you think right-wing law and economics work is
the most valuable now being done in legal academia, your neutral "intra-
genre" criteria won't help you choose between a third rate econ-jock and
a much  higher  ranked centrist  "doctrinal"  candidate.  Some  quite pa-
tently ideological or cultural criterion of appropriate pluralism will have
to come in at the end,  or the outcome will be random.
But what of the scholar of color who rejects this patently ideological
version of standards, and himself or herself demands to be judged color-
blind?103  If this demand is addressed to a law faculty that is deciding on
hiring or promotion, it is misaddressed.  The faculty will decide by vote,
on the basis  of each faculty member's understanding  of the appropriate
criteria.  I wouldn't see myself as  bound  to vote  against  a candidate  I
would  otherwise  favor  .because  the  candidate  wanted  to  be  judged
colorblind.
If the candidate thinks he had the benefit of what he regards  as an
illegitimate preference; he can refuse the job, or take it and use his power
as a voting member to influence his colleagues  to abandon the error of
their ways.  We are dealing with an ideological  dispute about culturally
conscious  decision.  I don't see a faculty member as obliged to abandon
his or her position, even if the candidate  views the criterion as  "insult-
ing" or as "derogating from individuality,"  unless I am persuaded on the
merits that this is the case.104
103.  This last section is  a response to Carter, supra note  22.
104.  This view is dependent on the existence of real disagreement among minorities about affirm-
ative action.  If there were  an indisputable consensus  among blacks,  say, that culturally conscious
decisionmaking is "derogation"  and "insult,"  and an equally indisputable willingness to abide by the
consequences, it would be a tough  call whether affirmative  action should continue.  My  problem
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But now  suppose I am  addressed  as  an individual,  rather  than as
someone voting on hiring of promotion.  The demand is simply for my
judgment:  Is this person of color "the best law teacher" in the school, or
"the  best scholar,"  or is  this particular  article the "best  in  the  field"?
Suppose further that this scholar does his or her damnedest to write as a
member  not of an  ethnic culture  but of the "cosmopolitan"  culture  to
which  Kennedy  refers  approvingly.10 5  It might  be possible  to  answer
without  cultural identity  playing  any  role at  all.  A  white  or  a black
scholar might so overwhelmingly  dominate that it just wouldn't be plau-
sible that anyone else could be "the best."
In this sense,  law teaching and  scholarship have  an irreducible  re-
semblance to a game with highly determinate  rules.  The resemblance is
not in the rules, but in the possibility of a person being so good that any
particular observer will judge  without hesitation.1 0 6  This possibility also
exists at the bottom end.  But such cases are rare.
In the usual case,  it will be possible  to answer  "without regard to
race" only if we pose the question narrowly enough.  The article is within
a particular genre.  Suppose the author has either deliberately or just nat-
urally written it in such a way that no reader would be likely to advert to
the question of the author's race in reading it.  This means, as a matter of
fact, that a white reader is likely to assume that the author was white, but
suppose the reader is reading lots of articles and knows some of them are
by blacks.  The reader can rank the articles colorblind.
If I am  the reader,  I will  have  an ideological judgment  about the
genre.  The genre is the product of a joint scholarly  endeavor  in para-
digm creation.  It has a cultural history.  The vast majority of recogniza-
ble genres, moreover, have a specifically white, ideologically moderate or
conservative history.  Their culture and ideology is built into their rules,
their habitual literary and intellectual devices.  If I am asked to compare
an article in such a genre with one that has a different cultural and ideo-
logical  history, my comparison  will be based  on my  own  cultural  and
ideological situation.  I can rank the black author of an antitrust article
in  the  interest-balancing-cum-institutional-competence  genre  against
other authors  in the same genre without race having  any effect  on the
judgment.  But  in  the  cross-genre  comparison,  I  will  understand  and
would be my (ideological)  conviction that the type of judgment required is both politically incorrect,
impossible to do, and bad for legal scholarship.  I might nonetheless  feel that the value of cultural
pluralism  paradoxically  required  agreeing to the self-exclusion  that would  result from colorblind
judgment.
105.  R. Kennedy, supra note 3,  at 1802.
106.  On the vexed question of the boundary between situations in which judgment seems some-
how "compelled"  and those in which we experience it as closer to "choice,"  see supra notes 57 and
76.
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rank his article  as the product of a white, ideologically moderate group
identity.
When I am told after the fact that the author was black, my reaction
will be that the author is an excellent performer in the cultural mode of
the dominant community.  This is a far cry from "the best, period."  In
other words, I do not regard the genres of the "cosmopolitan"  culture as
universal vessels into which each of us is free to pour his or her individ-
ual content.  They are vessels but they are also molds, each with a history
as part of the project of domination and subordination, as well as a his-
tory as part of the project of transcendence and enlightenment.
Now  suppose the question  is about teaching.  I judge teachers  ac-
cording to the values I myself aspire to as a teacher.  My view is that law
teaching is inescapably an intelligentsia activity of cultural and ideologi-
cal development in a situation of contest, domination and subordination.
But I also fully recognize and embrace the craft dimension of law.  I can
rank  teachers  colorblind  according  to their skill in getting students  to
understand the meaning and relationship of an easement, a covenant and
an equitable servitude.  But a teacher whose course teaches only this kind
of determinate  content  and  cognitive  skill  is pursuing  a culturally  de-
rived,  ideologically  charged  agenda,  teaching  a philosophy  of law  by
omission.  The teacher who goes  beyond this cognitive minimum is mov-
ing not toward "neutrality,"  but toward some different, more explicit but
no less ideological  philosophy  of law.
Whatever  the solution,  from the purely  cognitive to the explicitly
culturally-conscious  and political, the teacher's  relation to the students
has a  symbolic  dimension:  the  teacher  is black  or white,  a  purported
"neutral, black letter man" or a touchy-feely liberal.  Every teacher does
something with these contingent attributes in the classroom, consciously
or unconsciously.  His or her individuality does not exist in a way that
can  be distinguished  from them.  Well,  you  will  say, he  or  she  could
teach  from behind  a screen.  Then  the choice  to use a particular voice
would be a choice to situate himself or herself in the American cultural
context.  But he or she could write on a word processor that would flash
his  or her  words  onto  the  screen.  Right.  But  the words  themselves
would communicate not only  an individual but an individual's  choices
among  the multiple  ways  of expression  that characterize  a  society  di-
vided the way ours is.  And so forth.
And what would be gained by teaching from behind a screen with a
word processor flashing one's words before the students?  The teachers
who chose this method could be ranked colorblind a lot more plausibly
than those who chose the "normal"  method.  But in comparing them to
those  who  taught  as  culturally  and  ideologically  situated  individuals,
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openly  deploying  and  developing  those  aspects  of  their  identity,  we
would find ourselves judging the cultural and ideological  context of the
choice.  Unless the fundamentalists  made everyone teach their way, they
could never be sure they were "the best, period,"  and not just "the best
white"  or "the best black."
In order to achieve  Kennedy's ideal meritocratic academy, we have
to imagine that both the bitter and the sweet of cultural  and ideological
differences  are eliminated or reduced to such an extent that it no longer
seems important to take them into account in structuring hiring and pro-
motion.  So long  as they exist, there  will be an element  of cultural and
ideological contingency to judgments of merit, or an element of arbitrari-
ness  in substituting  "objective"  but non-substantive  criteria.  I  see the
differences and the process of self-consciously negotiating to take the ele-
ment of contingency into account as valuable in themselves.  So the fun-
damentalist utopia seems to me impoverished.  We could have colorblind
meritocracy  only in  a society  less desirable  than  ours would  be, if we
could preserve class, cultural, community and ideological differences but
consciously mitigate their bad effects.
V.  CONCLUSION
If there is a conceptual theme to this Article, it is that of "positional-
ity,"  or "situatedness."  The individual in his or her culture, the individ-
ual as a practitioner of an ideology, the  individual in relation to his or
her own neurotic structures, is always somewhere,  has always just been
somewhere  else, and is empowered  and limited by being in that spot on
the way from some other spot.  Communities  are like that too, though in
a complicated way.  One of the things that defines  a community's  posi-
tion-its situation, and the specific possibilities that go with it-is its his-
tory  of  collective  accomplishment.  Another  is  its  history  of  crimes
against humanity.  It seems unlikely that there are communities  without
such histories.
The crime of slavery is deep in the past of white America.  But ever
since slavery,  in each succeeding decade after the Emancipation Procla-
mation,  we have  added  new  crimes  until  it  sometimes  seems  that the
weight of commission and omission lies so heavily on non-white America
that there just isn't anything that anyone can do about it.  All anyone can
hope is to be out of the way of the whirlwind, the big one and all the little
ones played out in day-to-day life.
The bad history also creates  opportunities  that other communities
don't have,  or have  in different  ways.  It would be  quite something to
build  a  multicultural  society  on the basis of what has  happened  here,
where we have neither a consensual foundation in history nor a myth of
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human benevolence to make it all seem natural.  An American multicul-
tural society will arise out of guilt, anger, mistrust, cynicism, bitter con-
flict,  and a great deal of confusion  and contradiction,  if it arises  at all,
and would be, to my mind, the more wonderful for it.
Of course, the specific proposal  put forth above, for a kind of cul-
tural  proportional  representation  in the  exercise  of  ideological  power
through legal academia, would be a very small step in that direction.  As
is true of any very specific proposal that can be implemented right now
by  small  numbers  of people  holding  local  power,  it is  a  drop  in the
bucket.  But the minute we imagine it as a government policy applied in a
consistent way across the whole range of situations to which it is argua-
bly applicable, it loses most of its appeal.  First, none of us local power-
holders could do much to bring it about, and, second, taking the proposal
seriously as state policy might lead to all kinds of disastrous unintended
side-effects.
This has been a proposal for drops  in the bucket, not for the reor-
ganization of state power.  If it made a trivial contribution at vast social
cost, we could abandon it as we adopted it, faculty by faculty, decision by
decision.  If it worked,  the "kerplunk"  of drops  falling  in near  empty
buckets might cause others to prick up their ears.  And in any case, legal
academics  can and so should exercise  their power to govern themselves
in accord with the ideals of democracy and intellectual integrity-  ideals
that white supremacy compromises  all around us.
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